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Neuro-Voir Dire and the Architecture of Bias 
Dov Fox*
Courts and commentators routinely assume that “bias” on the jury encompasses any 
source of influence upon jurors that does not come directly from the evidence presented 
at trial. This sweeping conception of juror bias is flawed because it fails to distinguish the 
prejudices and affinities that infect jury decisionmaking from the experiences and 
perspectives that enrich it. This Article uses a thought experiment informed by the 
neuroscience of bias to illuminate the complexity of juror influences that go by the name 
of bias. I distinguish four distinct categories of juror influence: personal interests, 
community interests, case-specific beliefs, and case-general beliefs. I apply this spectrum 
of juror bias to provide a sounder way to think about what kind of juries we want. 
 
 
I argue that trial courts should limit the interrogation and disqualification of prospective 
jurors to personal interests in the case—whether social or financial—and to case-specific 
beliefs arising from pretrial facts or rumors about the parties or events. By contrast, I 
would permit no such wholesale exclusion, either for community interests, which range 
from principles of justice to desires for vengeance, or for case-general beliefs about social 
causes or groups, which span scruples to dogmatism, and empathy to bigotry. My 
proposal to abolish challenges for these latter categories of outside influence raises the 
serious concern that accommodating their presence on the jury risks facilitating unjust 
outcomes, jury nullification, and hung juries. Trial courts should mitigate these risks by 
adopting two bias-tempering measures. First, jury pools should be diversified in ways that 
social cognition research suggests would attenuate the influence of unreflexive or 
objectionable attitudes. Second, judges should instruct deliberating jurors to express, 
along with their own position, the strongest counterarguments to it, so as to disrupt 
exaggerated assumptions of division and facilitate openness to persuasion. 
 
 
 * Assistant Professor of Law, University of San Diego School of Law. I am grateful for 
conversation and comments to Larry Alexander, Ron Allen, Kiel Brennan-Marquez, Kevin Cole, Don 
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Mike Seidman, Francis Shen, Dan Simon, John Villasenor, Robin West, and the law faculty workshop 
participants at Georgetown and San Diego. Special thanks for exceptional research assistance to the 
reference librarians at the University of San Diego Legal Research Center and for helpful editorial 
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Introduction 
Impartiality is not a technical conception. It is a state of mind. 
—Skilling v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 2896, 2917 (2010) (quoting 
United States v. Wood, 299 U.S. 123, 145 (1936)). 
The acquittal of George Zimmerman for the shooting death of 
Trayvon Martin was more than a flashpoint for race relations in the 
United States. It also illustrated an enduring puzzle about what makes 
jury verdicts legitimate. Charges of bias were widespread after this “trial 
of a neighborhood watchman for shooting an unarmed black kid,” before 
“a jury with no black members.”1
 
 1. William Saletan, Jury Rigged: Did Racism Skew the Zimmerman Verdict?, Slate (July 17, 
2013, 4:02 PM), http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/frame_game/2013/07/ 
zimmerman_jury_bias_did_racism_or_stand_your_ground_skew_the_verdict.html. As this Article 
 Many critics seem ultimately to have 
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accepted the jury’s decision, however, either because “justice is defined 
by the verdict that follows a fair trial”2 or because, as President Obama 
put it to the American public, “a jury has spoken.”3
Why do we put such faith in the jury? The institutions whose 
decisions the government affords the force of law are usually thought to 
acquire their legitimacy from mechanisms designed to hold those 
decisionmakers responsible. Accordingly, legislators are beholden to their 
constituents; agency administrators answer to elected representatives; and 
even unelected judges must articulate the reasons that support their 
rulings.
 
4 Within this system of democratic accountability, the institution of 
the jury looks like an anomaly.5
Juries render verdicts that determine liability, guilt, and even death. 
Yet jurors are neither rewarded for sound verdicts nor penalized for 
specious ones.
 
6 Their deliberations are shrouded in secrecy and they 
provide no justification for the decisions they reach.7 “[I]nformation 
enters and legal conclusions are produced,” as one court explained, but 
“[t]he methods and reasons for arriving at those conclusions are 
unknown.”8 The black box that produces jury verdicts is often perceived 
as “almost-mystical,”9 or “akin to a religious revelation.”10 Indeed, one of 
the few points of convergence among commentators following the 
Zimmerman trial is that “we look to jurors to be modern-day oracles.”11
 
went to press, another predominantly white Florida jury, in a case similar to the Zimmerman trial, 
declined to convict a white man, Michael Dunn, of first-degree murder after he fatally shot an 
unarmed black teenager, Jordan Davis. See Timothy Williams, 3 Opposed First-Degree Murder 
Conviction in Florida Trial, N.Y. Times, Feb. 20, 2014, at A10.  
 
 2. Charles Krauthammer, The Zimmerman Case: A Touch of Sanity, Wash. Post (July 18, 2013), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/charles-krauthammer-the-zimmerman-case--a-touch-of-
sanity/2013/07/18/35f30c00-efdd-11e2-a1f9-ea873b7e0424_story.html. 
 3. Press Release, The White House, Office of the Press Sec’y, Statement by the President 
(July 14, 2013), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/07/14/statement-
president. 
 4. See, e.g., Dov Fox, Interest Creep, 83 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 237 (2014). 
 5. See, e.g., James Q. Whitman, The Origins of Reasonable Doubt: Theological Roots of 
the Criminal Trial 12−13, 56 (2008). 
 6. That jurors are convened to decide a single case before being disbanded, Calabresi and 
Bobbitt argue, equips them to disguise or diffuse the unpopular tradeoffs involved in “tragic choices” 
that sacrifice one human life or sacred value for another. Guido Calabresi & Philip Bobbitt, Tragic 
Choices 57−62 (1978). For discussion of jury trade-offs as between a suspect law and the rule of law 
itself, see infra notes 233−237 and accompanying text. 
 7. See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar, Note, Choosing Representatives by Lottery Voting, 93 Yale L.J. 
1283, 1290 n.45 (1984) (calling “[u]naccountability . . . a hallmark of the American jury”). 
 8. Children Int’l v. Ammon Painting Co., 215 S.W.3d 194, 200 (Mo. Ct. App. 2006). 
 9. David Alan Sklansky, Evidentiary Instructions and the Jury as Other, 65 Stan. L. Rev. 407, 
410 (2013). 
 10. Julie A. Seaman, Black Boxes, 58 Emory L.J. 427, 487 (2008). 
 11. Adam Cohen, The Lessons of George Zimmerman’s ‘Not Guilty’ Verdict, Time (July 14, 2013), 
http://ideas.time.com/2013/07/14/the-lesson-of-george-zimmermans-not-guilty-verdict. 
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In the absence of safeguards against arbitrary or unjust 
decisionmaking, the jury’s legitimacy comes from the most salient 
constitutional requirement of its composition: that jurors be 
“impartial.”12 Jury doctrine says little, however, about what such 
impartiality requires beyond that jurors be “free[] from any bias.”13
The word “bias” appears nowhere in those clauses of the Sixth or 
Seventh Amendments, which apply the jury impartiality mandate to 
criminal and many civil trials.
 
14 But the jurisprudence of jury impartiality 
leans heavily on that concept. The Supreme Court has long emphasized 
that the aim to “prevent[] bias . . . . lies at the very heart of the jury 
system.”15 Courts have accordingly affirmed that the bias of “even a single 
juror would violate [the] right to a fair trial” by “impartial, indifferent 
jurors.”16
We usually think of bias as a decidedly pejorative state of mind 
marked by odious prejudices or unfounded stereotypes. The Supreme 
Court, however, often talks about jury bias in more sweeping terms. The 
Court has repeatedly affirmed that bias constitutes “any influence” that 
jurors acquire outside of the “evidence and argument [presented] in open 
court.”
 
17 This blanket conception of jury bias as comprising “any outside 
influence” runs deep in the law.18
 
 12. U.S. Const. amend. VI. See Richard M. Re, Note, Re-Justifying the Fair Cross Section 
Requirement: Equal Representation and Enfranchisement in the American Criminal Jury, 116 Yale L.J. 
1568, 1580 (2007) (arguing that jurors who lack special incentives or qualifications “acquire the 
information necessary to render legitimate verdicts after assuming their posts”). 
 As far back as the treason trial of 
Aaron Burr, Chief Justice Marshall made clear that although “perhaps 
impossible” to obtain such a jury in practice, it would be “extremely 
 13. Hayes v. Missouri, 120 U.S. 68, 70 (1887). For discussion of the indeterminacy of jury 
impartiality in the doctrine, see Scott W. Howe, Juror Neutrality or an Impartiality Array? A Structural 
Theory of The Impartial Jury Mandate, 70 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1173, 1176 (1995) (“The Court’s 
opinions leave the concept of . . . impartiality murky.”); William S. Laufer, The Rhetoric of Innocence, 
70 Wash. L. Rev. 329, 396 n.308 (1995) (“[C]ourts have been less than clear as to what is meant by the 
construct of impartiality.”); Toni M. Massaro, Peremptories or Peers? Rethinking Sixth Amendment 
Doctrine, Images, and Procedures, 64 N.C. L. Rev. 501, 529 (1986) (lamenting the doctrinal absence of 
a “meaningful standard” of jury impartiality). 
 14. The Sixth Amendment guarantee of an “impartial jury” has been extended from federal to 
state cases through the Fourteenth Amendment, Ristaino v. Ross, 424 U.S. 589, 595 n.6 (1976), and 
from criminal to civil cases under the Seventh. Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 630 
(1991) (“Civil juries, no less than their criminal counterparts, must . . . act as impartial factfinders.”). 
My analysis applies to both criminal and civil juries, though their different sizes, voting rules, legal 
questions, and standards of proof make some of the proposals described in Part III more important for 
criminal than civil juries. 
 15. J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 154 (1994) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (quoting 
Thiel v. S. Pac. Co., 328 U.S. 217, 220 (1946)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 16. Dyer v. Calderon, 151 F.3d 970, 973 (9th Cir. 1998) (en banc). 
 17. Skilling v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 2896, 2913 (2010) (quoting Patterson v. Colorado, 205 U.S. 
454, 462 (1907) (emphasis added)). 
 18. Id. at 2948 (quoting Patterson, 205 U.S. at 462 (emphasis added)). 
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desirable” for courts to empanel only those individuals who come to trial 
altogether lacking in “any prepossessions whatever.”19
A thought experiment can help test the desirability of that 
aspiration to identify jurors who are thus unbiased in the sense that they 
are “induced only by evidence and argument in open court.”
 
20 Imagine a 
machinesomething like a metal detector for your brainthat could 
effectively scan potential jurors as they wait at the courthouse to reveal 
the presence and magnitude of every such outside influence that much in 
jury law refers to as bias. Call it “neuro-voir dire.” The phrase is Hank 
Greely’s. He proposed some years ago that potential jurors might one 
day be “put in a scanner and shown images relevant to a possible bias in 
the case” while their “brains’ reactions” were examined for that bias as a 
ground upon which to disqualify them from jury service.21
I suspect that many of us would recoil at the prospect of brain 
scanning prospective jurors for signs of any outside influences in order to 
exclude from the jury those who harbor such influences with sufficient 
strength. Neuro-voir dire should give us pause, but not because it violates 
juror privacy. The wholesale exclusion of bias is troubling because it fails 
to recognize that outside mental influences are as diverse as the jurors 
who harbor them and the conditions under which they arise. 
 Would the 
constitutional guarantee of an impartial jury permit or even require trial 
courts to adopt this perfect technology of bias detection? 
Treating all such non-evidentiary influences in the same way misses 
important normative and constitutional distinctions among them. Consider 
four types of outside influences that are captured in the juror statements 
reported in the following recent cases: 
• “[W]hen Indians get alcohol, they all get drunk, and . . . when they 
get drunk, they get violent.”22
• “I overheard today—other jurors talking” about how the defendants 
took out “an insurance policy that they could collect on” if convicted.
 
23
• “[I have had] good and bad experiences with [the] police . . . [in part] 
because [I am] a Latino, [and] because [I have] an accent.’”
 
24
• “[I would want to] give that person a ‘lighter sentence’ [out of] . . . . 





 19. United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 49, 50−51 (C.C.D. Va. 1807) (No. 14,692g). 
 
 20. Skilling, 130 S. Ct. at 2913 (quoting Patterson, 205 U.S. at 462 (emphasis added)). 
 21. Henry T. Greely, Law and the Revolution in Neuroscience: An Early Look at the Field, 
42 Akron L. Rev. 687, 697 (2009). 
 22. United States v. Benally, 546 F.3d 1230, 1231 (10th Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 558 U.S. 1051 
(2009) (internal quotations marks omitted). 
 23. Skilling v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 2896, 2957−58 (2010) (Sotomayor, J., concurring in part 
and dissenting in part). 
 24. People v. Fowler, 845 N.Y.S.2d 599, 601 (2007). 
 25. State v. Stern, No. A–4744–10T1, 2013 WL 1798908, at *3 (N.J. Super. Ct., Apr. 30, 2013). 
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The ethnic bigotry and backdoor rumors that are reflected in the 
first two statements exemplify corrosive juror influences that can make a 
trial categorically unfair. By contrast, the cultural perspectives and 
convictions about justice in the last two statements typify the benign or 
even constructive influences that inform a jury of peers and help it to 
speak in the voice of the community. Yet these perspectives and 
convictions are no less “outside” influences than are bigotry and rumors 
that jury impartiality doctrine tends to lump under the catchall of bias. 
Legal scholars have examined the implications of brain imaging for 
two mental states that figure prominently in law: deception26 and pain.27 
But there has been no such neuroscientifically informed legal inquiry 
into bias.28 This Article offers the first. It uses neuro-voir dire as a 
motivating hypothetical or “intuition pump” that presses us to distinguish 
pernicious juror influences from desirable ones.29
This Article makes two contributions. First, it discredits the dominant 
conception of juror bias that lacks the resources to distinguish good and 
bad sources of juror influence. Second, it develops a novel spectrum of 
cognitive bias with which to adjudicate complex questions of jury 
impartiality in more principled and practical ways. 
 
Part I traces our confusion about juror bias to two irreconcilable 
ideals of the jury. The first expects jurors to maintain an objective point 
of view, detached from the idiosyncrasies that threaten erratic or 
specious decisionmaking. The second ideal insists that those subjective 
experiences or attitudes are precisely what qualify jurors as laypersons 
and peers to render a commonsense verdict that takes community norms 
of fairness into account. It will not do simply to say that we must balance 
these ideals of the jury by teasing the good kinds of bias apart from the 
 
 26. See, e.g., Amanda C. Pustilnik, Neurotechnologies at the Intersection of Criminal Procedure 
and Constitutional Law, in The Constitution and the Future of the Criminal Law (John T. Parry & 
L. Song Richardson eds., 2013); Nita A. Farahany, Incriminating Thoughts, 64 Stan. L. Rev. 351 
(2012); Dov Fox, The Right to Silence as Protecting Mental Control, 42 Akron L. Rev. 763 (2009); 
Henry T. Greely & Judy Illes, Neuroscience-Based Lie Detection: The Urgent Need for Regulation, 
33 Am. J.L. & Med. 377 (2007); Michael S. Pardo, Neuroscience Evidence, Legal Culture, and Criminal 
Procedure, 33 Am. J. Crim. L. 301 (2005); Julie Seaman, Black Boxes: fMRI Lie Detection and the Role 
of the Jury, 42 Akron L. Rev. 931 (2009); Francis X. Shen, Neuroscience, Mental Privacy, and the Law, 
36 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 653 (2013). 
 27. See, e.g., Adam J. Kolber, Pain Detection and the Privacy of Subjective Experience, 33 Am. J.L. 
& Med. 433 (2007); Adam J. Kolber, The Experiential Future of the Law, 60 Emory L.J. 585 (2011); 
Adam J. Kolber, The Subjective Experience of Punishment, 109 Colum. L. Rev. 182 (2009); Amanda 
C. Pustilnik, Pain as Fact and Heuristic: How Pain Neuroimaging Illuminates Moral Dimensions of 
Law, 97 Cornell L. Rev. 801 (2012). 
 28. The only sustained legal inquiry that I have seen consider the neuroscience of bias mentions 
the jury just once in passing to suggest that “[t]he justice system might even go so far as to educate 
juries, in appropriate cases, regarding the role that race can play in shaping and misshaping the 
evidence presented to them.” Christian M. Halliburton, Race, Brain Science, and Critical Decision-
Making in the Context of Constitutional Criminal Procedure, 47 Gonz. L. Rev. 319, 339−40 (2011). 
 29. See, e.g., Daniel C. Dennett, Intuition Pumps and Other Tools for Thinking (2013). 
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bad. The monolithic concept of bias that prevails in law and in science 
deprives courts of a conceptual vocabulary with which to strike a 
principled balance between the objective and subjective ideals of the jury. 
Part II employs neuro-voir dire as a theoretical device to critically 
examine that conception of bias that treats all outside influences as if 
they were the same for purposes of achieving jury impartiality. It is easy 
to suppose that concerns about cognitive privacy distinguish neuro-voir 
dire from conventional juror questioning. But juror privacy interests are 
declined the constitutional status that is afforded to the impartiality right 
that voir dire is designed to vindicate. 
The problem with neuro-voir dire is not that it would be a radical 
departure from existing practices of jury selection. To the contrary, it is 
similar in spirit to the methods of questioning jurors that we already 
accept. This resemblance to traditional voir dire does not, however, 
vindicate neurotechnological efforts to preserve “the purity of trial by 
jury” by attempting to ensure “that every juror shall be free from bias,”30 
or at least “as nearly” free from “potential and latent bias . . . . as the lot 
of humanity will admit.”31
This Article develops a new way of thinking about juror bias. It 
identifies four categories of outside influence: personal interests, 
community interests, case-specific beliefs, and case-general beliefs. This 
spectrum of cognitive biases helps to reconcile the objective and 
subjective ideals of the jury in principled and practical ways. Courts 
should restrict the interrogation and disqualification of jurors to two 
categories of juror bias: personal interests in the case, whether social or 
financial, and case-specific beliefs arising from pretrial facts or rumors 
about the parties or events. 
 Both high-tech and low-tech methods of bias 
detection err to the extent that they collapse all possible sources of 
outside juror influence under the same uniform conception of bias. 
This proposal would permit neither interrogation nor 
disqualification of jurors, by contrast, for community interests—which 
may range from conceptions of justice to desire for vengeance—or case-
general beliefs about social causes or groups—ranging from scruples to 
dogmatism, from empathy to bigotry. This Article proposes two 
mechanisms designed to temper objectionable kinds of outside influence. 
The first is to diversify the jury pool by expanding the source lists of 
those eligible to be called for service. The second is to require judges to 
instruct jurors in ways that encourage them to admit ambivalence and 
appreciate competing views. 
 
 30. Aldridge v. United States, 283 U.S. 308, 312 n.2 (1931) (quoting State v. McAfee, 64 N.C. 339, 
340 (1870)). 
 31. State v. Lumumba, 601 A.2d 1178, 1187 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1992) (citation omitted). 
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I.  The Pictures in our Heads 
Journalist Walter Lippmann explained in his 1922 book Public 
Opinion that modern existence had become “altogether too big, too 
complex, and too fleeting” for people to navigate contemporary society 
without bringing to bear on their decisions a range of simplifying 
“pictures” that “we carry about in our heads.”32 Lippmann explained that 
“we have to reconstruct” the world around us “before we can manage 
with it. To traverse the world men must have maps of the world.”33 It is 
through these mental maps, he said, that “heroes are incarnated, devils 
are made.”34
Lippmann was referring specifically to group “stereotypes,” a term 
that his book introduced to popular vernacular.
 
35 His reflections about the 
simplifying pictures in our heads, however, capture a much broader range 
of cognitive, cultural, perceptual, and motivational influences on the way 
that people, jurors included, process information and make decisions.36
Of course, jurors do not reach verdicts as individuals in isolation. 
Jurors’ biases are filtered through the process of group deliberations. 
These deliberations might in particular cases reflect the sum of individual 
biases, amplify certain among those biases through the process of 
groupthink,
 
37 or blunt other such biases in a manner depicted by the film 
Twelve Angry Men.38 The Supreme Court has made clear that the 
impartiality determinations about “[j]ury competence” are, as a 
constitutional matter, “an individual rather than a group or class matter.”39
A. Two Competing Ideals of the Jury 
 
So jury impartiality must, according to the doctrine, be evaluated as a 
measure of individual bias. 
In the law and literature, we embrace two attractive yet incompatible 
ideals of the jury. The first demands objective finders of fact in the search 
for truth. This ideal directs trial courts to “aspire to” jurors who exhibit 
 
 32. Walter Lippmann, Public Opinion 16, 89 (1922). 
 33. Id. at 16. 
 34. Id. at 10. 
 35. Id. at 79. 
 36. See, e.g., Sara Gordon, Through the Eyes of Jurors: The Use of Schemas in the Application of 
‘Plain-Language’ Jury Instructions, 64 Hastings L.J. 643, 663−65 (2013) (examining social science 
findings that jurors’ preexisting attitudes about the law shape their use of jury instructions); Christine 
Jolls & Cass R. Sunstein, The Law of Implicit Bias, 94 Calif. L. Rev. 969, 975 (2006) (arguing that 
implicit race bias resembles other unconscious cognitive biases). 
 37. See generally Irving L. Janis, Groupthink: Psychological Studies of Policy Decisions and 
Fiascoes (1982) (examining psychological patterns of group dynamics). 
 38. 12 Angry Men (United Artists 1957). 
 39. Thiel v. S. Pac. Co., 328 U.S. 217, 220 (1946). 
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“child-like innocence,”40 as Adrian Vermeule’s puts it, in the sense that 
they are, in Lisa Kern Griffin’s words, “as free from cognitive bias as 
possible.”41 Accordingly, any juror “preconceptions” that “derive from 
an ‘extrajudicial source’” constitute “bias in the pejorative sense” that 
“the law will find invidious.”42
On this account, the blindfold worn by Lady Justice wards off the 
distorting influence of any factors that might compromise jurors’ 
consideration of the testimony and evidence alone. Trial courts have 
appealed to this concept when they instruct jurors, as Judge Garland E. 
Burrell did last year in the Eastern District of California, to “take all of 
the experiences that . . . have contributed to how you think about 




The second ideal insists that jurors’ subjective viewpoints equip them 
to speak with “the voice of the community.”
 Call this the objective ideal of the jury. 
44 Unlike the single, 
professional judge who decides a bench trial, “a jury, in exercising its 
collective wisdom, is expected to bring its opinions, insights, common 
sense, and everyday life experience into deliberations.”45 This rival ideal of 
the jury regards Lady Justice’s blindfold not as enabling fair-minded 
integrity, but as an imperiling parochialism in need of context and 
perspective.46 Here, jurors are enriched by their particular convictions 
and life circumstances.47 These kinds of influences do not, under this 
alternative ideal of the jury, constitute “bias in need of silencing.”48
The “deep-seated hunches . . . about social life”
 
49 and other lessons 
that “their human experience has taught them”50
 
 40. Adrian Vermeule, Contra Nemo Iudex in Sua Causa: The Limits of Impartiality, 122 Yale 
L.J. 384, 403 (2012). 
 instead equip jurors, as 
Darryl Brown and Martha Minow have explained, to “empathize with 
 41. Lisa Kern Griffin, Narrative, Truth, and Trial, 101 Geo. L.J. 281, 315 (2013). 
 42. Vermeule, supra note 40, at 403. 
 43. Taylor v. Sisto, 606 F.3d 622, 623 (9th Cir. 2010), superseded by 449 F. App’x 665 (9th Cir. 2011). 
 44. See BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 600 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting); see also 
Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447, 461 (1984) (“Since the jury serves as the voice of the community, the 
jury is in the best position to decide whether a particular crime is so heinous that the community’s 
response must be death.”). 
 45. See State v. Briggs, 776 P.2d 1347, 1355 (Wash. Ct. App. 1989); see also Bibbins v. Dalsheim, 
21 F.3d 13, 17 (2d Cir. 1994) (praising “the fund of ordinary experience that jurors may bring to the 
jury room and may rely upon”). 
 46. See Judith Resnik & Dennis Curtis, Representing Justice: Invention, Controversy, and 
Rights in City-States and Democratic Courtrooms 62 (2011). 
 47. Neil Vidmar & Valerie P. Hans, American Juries: The Verdict 66 (2007) (arguing that 
juries, besides finding facts, are “also supposed to represent the various views of the community”). 
 48. Jeffrey Abramson, We, the Jury 195 (1994). 
 49. Darryl K. Brown, The Role of Race in Jury Impartiality and Venue Transfers, 53 Md. L. Rev. 
107, 122 (1994). 
 50. Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S. 625, 642 (1980) (citation ommited).  
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others” and “know what is fair in this world, not in a laboratory.”51 Jurors’ 
preexisting values and idiosyncratic worldviews are on this conception 
precisely what afford the jury its special “capacity,” as Justice Thurgood 
Marshall has affirmed, “to render a commonsense, laymen’s judgment, as a 
representative body drawn from the community.”52
Jury law clutches to both of these ideals in schizophrenic fashion. 
For example, jurors in criminal and civil trials alike are instructed before 
they deliberate to “decide the facts” based on nothing more than “the 
evidence” and at the same time to rely on their “common sense[] and 
experience.”
 This is the subjective 
ideal of the jury. 
53 After a verdict has been announced, Federal Rule of 
Evidence 606(b) implicitly preserves space for the subjective ideal by 
forbidding jurors from testifying “about any statement made or incident 
that occurred during the jury’s deliberations.”54 Yet it also reinforces the 
objective ideal by exempting post-verdict reports of any “outside 
influence . . . brought to bear on any juror.”55
Jury impartiality and equal protection jurisprudence likewise reflect 
these irreconcilable ideals of the jury. The Supreme Court affirms a 




 51. Martha Minow, Stripped Down Like a Runner or Enriched by Experience: Bias and 
Impartiality of Judges and Jurors, 33 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1201, 1203 (1992). 
 when it requires measures 
designed to help the jury exercise “the commonsense judgment of the 
 52. Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356, 402 (1972) (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
 53. See, e.g., State Bar of Ariz. Civil Jury Inst. Comm., Revised Arizona Jury Instructions 
(Civil) Preliminary 1, Preliminary 5 (5th ed. 2013). See 27 Charles Alan Wright & Victor James 
Gold, Federal Practice and Procedure § 6075 (2d ed. 2007). Jury nullification is another example. 
The subjective ideal accounts in part for why we allow the jury in certain cases to refuse to enforce the 
law when doing so conflicts with their best understandings of justice, while the objective ideal explains 
why judges may not openly encourage such resistance to enact those outside perspectives. See United 
States v. Navarro-Vargas, 408 F.3d 1184, 1199 (9th Cir. 2005) (en banc). 
 54. Fed. R. Evid. 606(b). 
 55. Id.; see Tanner v. United States, 483 U.S. 107, 127 (1987) (holding that voir dire and other trial 
safeguards leave Rule 606(b)’s prohibition on inquiry into jury verdicts consistent with the Sixth 
Amendment guarantee of an impartial jury). Circuit courts are split on how narrowly to interpret 
Rule 606(b)’s bar on the admissibility of post-verdict juror testimony about misconduct during jury 
deliberation. Compare United States v. Benally, 546 F.3d 1230, 1236−38 (10th Cir. 2008) (holding that 
post-verdict juror testimony about behavior during deliberations may be admitted only if it falls within 
Rule 606(b)’s manifest exceptions for “communicati[on] with third parties, bribes, and jury 
tampering”), and Williams v. Price, 343 F.3d 223, 225 (3d Cir. 2003) (holding that Rule 606(b) 
“categorically bar[s] juror testimony ‘as to any matter or statement occurring during the course of the 
jury’s deliberations’ even if the is not offered to explore the jury’s decision-making process in reaching 
the verdict” (quoting Fed. R. Evid. 606(b))), with United States v. Henley, 238 F.3d 1111, 1121 
(9th Cir. 2001) (citing Hard v. Burlington N. R.R., 812 F.2d 482, 485 (9th Cir. 1987)) (“[E]vidence of 
that juror’s alleged racial bias is indisputably admissible for the purposes of determining whether the 
juror’s responses [during voir dire] were truthful”) and United States v. Villar, 586 F.3d 76, 87 (1st Cir. 
2009) (“[T]he rule against juror impeachment cannot be applied so inflexibly as to bar juror testimony 
in those rare and grave cases where claims of racial or ethnic bias during jury deliberations implicate a 
defendant’s right to due process and an impartial jury.”). 
 56. Thiel v. S. Pac. Co., 328 U.S. 217, 227 (1946).  
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community.”57 Accordingly, it singles out for fair representation in the 
jury pool certain socially salient groups like sex or race whose 
membership tends to occasion valued “qualities of human nature and 
varieties of human experience,” and whose systematic exclusion would 
accordingly “deprive[] the jury of a perspective on human events that 
may have unsuspected importance in any case that may be presented.”58
Meanwhile, the objective ideal helps explain the Supreme Court’s 
Batson line of cases that forbid the exercise of peremptory challenges to 
prevent a prospective juror from serving on the jury
 
59 based on the same 
assumption that those same socially salient group “differences may 
produce a difference in outlook.”60
B. The Monolithic Conception of Bias 
 Each of these ideals has much to 
commend it. Yet neither is complete on its own. What leaves both the 
objective and subjective ideals deficient is the extent to which they 
presuppose a conception of juror bias that treats every outside source of 
juror influence the same. These two ideals of the jury share a fundamental 
flaw: failure to distinguish good influences from bad. 
The Supreme Court has defined bias on the jury as an individual 
“state of mind,” suggesting that a juror “will not act with entire 
 
 57. Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 530 (1975). The Court appears to have cabined this concept 
of “diffused impartiality” to the context of death-qualified juries. See Reid Hastie et al., Inside the 
Jury 11 (1983). 
 58. Peters v. Kiff, 407 U.S. 493, 503−04 (1972) (citations omitted); see, e.g., Taylor v. Louisiana, 
419 U.S. 522, 530 (1975) (invalidating law that exempted from jury service women who had not made 
declaration of willingness to serve); Thiel, 328 U.S. at 223 (striking down a jury selection method 
excluding low wage laborers). The Court has made clear that this fair cross-section mandate applies 
only to the venire of potential jurors, and not to the petit of actual jurors. See, e.g., Apodaca v. Oregon, 
406 U.S. 404, 411−13 (1972). It serves as more than a democratic check, however, on the judges, 
prosecutors, and police who direct the criminal justice system. See Taylor, 419 U.S. at 530; Lockhart v. 
McCree, 476 U.S. 162, 174−75 (1986). It is also, the Court has affirmed, “a means of assuring . . . an 
impartial” jury. Holland v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 474, 480 (1990). This inclusionary element of impartiality, 
although it applies only to the venire, reinforces that “one of the most important functions any jury 
can perform . . . is to maintain a link between [its verdict and] contemporary community values.” 
Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 519 n.15 (1968). This prohibition on empaneling a jury composed 
of people who come from “only special segments of the populace,” Taylor, 419 U.S. at 530, also helps 
to explain why just one state (Delaware) sanctions special expert juries in complex civil litigation, and 
even a Delaware court noted that exclusive juries are “contrary to fundamental concepts of jury trial 
and would substitute a method of selection that is inconsistent with established principles of justice.” 
See Bradley v. A. C. & S. Co., 1989 WL 70834, at *3 (Del. Super. Ct. May 23, 1989); see also James 
Oldham, Trial by Jury: The Seventh Amendment and Anglo-American Special Juries 177 (2006) 
(“Elite special juries surely are antithetical to the hard-fought, long-delayed goal of opening up jury 
service to everyone.”). 
 59. See generally Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986); see also J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 
511 U.S. 127, 129 (1994) (extending Batson’s ban on race-based juror exclusion to gender-based 
peremptory challenges); Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42, 59 (1992) (extending Batson to criminal 
defendants); Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 616 (1991) (extending Batson to 
private litigants in civil litigation). 
 60. See J.E.B., 511 U.S. at 156 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). 
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impartiality.”61 This understanding of bias sweeps more broadly than the 
immoderation or prejudice that the term usually conveys.62 On this 
account, bias encompasses, beyond just radical intolerance, “any outside 
influence” on a juror’s thinking about the case, where “outside” mental 
influences comprise those that cannot be traced directly to the evidence 
and “argument in open court.”63
This overarching understanding of bias as any outside influence 
resembles in its expansiveness the influential account of bias set forth by 
psychologists Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky. Kahneman and 
Tversky defined bias in terms of any “non-relevant factor” that people 
use to perceive stimuli, store perceptions, and process memories.
 
64 They 
showed how this bias distorts decisionmaking in “systematic and 
predictable” ways.65 Their “dual process theory” of cognition 
distinguishes the automatic kind of thinking that we engage in when we 
put one foot in front of the other from the deliberative kind when we 
make a choice about what to eat.66
Dual process theory supplies a corresponding account of mental bias 
that distinguishes the automatic kind of non-relevant factors—that affect 
our decisions when we think too little—from the deliberative kind—
when we think too much.
 
67 We usually think of racial bias, for example, 
as the deliberative kind held by the “juror who believes that blacks are 
violence prone or morally inferior.”68 But no less can “subconscious” 
fears induce jurors “to credit or discredit white witnesses as opposed to 
black witnesses,”69 some Supreme Court justices have recognized, or 
even serve to “determin[e] the verdict of guilt or innocence.”70
It makes no difference for purposes of jury impartiality whether bias 
is the automatic or deliberative kind. Impartiality doctrine cares only 
about “[t]he point at which” a bias is no longer “too weak to warp the 
 
 
 61. Hopt v. Utah, 120 U.S. 430, 432 (1887). 
 62. See, e.g., Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 550−52 (1994). 
 63. Patterson v. Colorado, 205 U.S. 454, 462 (1907). 
 64. See generally Daniel Kahneman, Thinking, Fast and Slow 8, 103, 139−40 (2011). 
 65. See, e.g., Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and 
Biases, 185 Science 1124, 1131 (1974) (discussing common errors in probabilistic reasoning based on such 
unreliable evidence as what appears typical (representativeness), what come easily to mind (availability), 
and what we learn of first (anchoring)). But see generally Gerd Gigerenzer et al., Simple Heuristics 
That Make Us Smart (1999) (arguing that “fast and frugal” mental shortcuts obstruct sound reasoning 
less often than they enable people to adapt in rational ways to their environment). 
 66. See generally Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 65; see also Keith E. Stanovich & Richard F. 
West, Individual Differences in Reasoning: Implications for the Rationality Debate?, 23 Behav. & Brain 
Sci. 645 (2000) (explaining variations in human reasoning). 
 67. See Tanja Rapus Benton et al., Eyewitness Memory Is Still Not Common Sense: Comparing Jurors, 
Judges and Law Enforcement to Eyewitness Experts, 20 Applied Cognitive Psychol. 115, 119−20 (2006). 
 68. Turner v. Murray, 476 U.S. 28, 35 (1986). 
 69. Id. at 42 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 70. Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42, 68 (1992) (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
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judgment” but “too strong to suppress.”71 The distinction between 
automatic and deliberative biases still serves the epistemic function that 
it is often more difficult to detect automatic biases of which people are 
unaware. That people are aware of their deliberative biases, however, 
makes it possible to hide or misrepresent them, whether to avoid 
revealing unpopular views, to appear evenhanded in a moral culture that 
prizes objectivity, or to provide an answer that they think will meet with 
the judge’s approval.72
A “growing body of social science” suggests that simply asking jurors 
whether they can be impartial is not likely to reveal with any reliability the 
presence or strength of many of the outside influences that they would in 
fact bring to bear on the questions at trial.
 
73 For example, social cognition 
research suggests that over eighty percent of American whites and Asians 
demonstrate at least unconscious bias in favor of whites compared to 
blacks.74 Additionally, mock juror studies reveal that this anti-black bias 
routinely influences verdicts and sentencing in cases in which a juror’s 
race differs from the defendant’s.75
The limited diagnosticity of self-reported bias casts serious doubt on 
the Supreme Court’s enduring confidence in its power as “the only sure 
 
 
 71. Briley v. Commonwealth, 279 S.E.2d 151, 154 (Va. 1981). 
 72. See Commonwealth v. Laguer, 571 N.E.2d 371, 377 (Mass. 1991) (noting that jurors “may be 
unaware” that they harbor some bias or “may have an interest in concealing” it); see also Richard 
Seltzer et al., Juror Honesty During the Voir Dire, 19 J. Crim. Just., 451, 453−58 (1991) (discussing bias 
gleaned from post-trial interviews with 190 jurors finding disparities between bias reported during 
pretrial voir dire). 
 73. See Chin v. Runnels, 343 F. Supp. 2d 891, 906 (N.D. Cal. 2004); see, e.g., Regina A. Schuller et 
al., The Impact of Prejudice Screening Procedures on Racial Bias in the Courtroom, 33 L. & Hum. 
Behav. 320, 321 (2009) (demonstrating pervasive unawareness of one’s biases related to race and 
arguing that “even if people are able to identify the possibility that they may be biased, . . . they may 
not fully understand how and to what extent biases can affect their decisions”). 
 74. See, e.g., Carol Izumi, Implicit Bias and the Illusion of Mediator Neutrality, 34 Wash. U. J.L. & 
Pol’y 71, 93 (2010); Shankar Vedantam, See No Bias, Wash. Post. Mag., Jan. 23, 2005, at 12, 15; 
Project Implicit, https://implicit.harvard.edu/implicit (last visited Apr. 24, 2014). Some scholars 
believe that much racial bias tends to resist detection because so many biases operate subconsciously. 
See, e.g., Jerry Kang et al., Implicit Bias in the Courtroom, 59 UCLA L. Rev. 1124, 1128−32 (2012). 
Others think it more plausible that people tend to be aware of their bias but are simply unwilling to 
admit how much influence it will have over the decisions they make. See Ralph Richard Banks & 
Richard Thompson Ford, (How) Does Unconscious Bias Matter?: Law, Politics, and Racial Inequality, 
58 Emory L.J. 1053, 1106−08 (2009); Amy L. Wax, The Discriminating Mind: Define It, Prove It, 
40 Conn. L. Rev. 979, 1021−22 (2008). Whether unwitting or disguised, bias frequently eludes not just 
self-reports and “evaluations of demeanor evidence.” Rosales-Lopez v. United States, 451 U.S. 182, 
188 (1981). It also evades subliminal evaluative measures such as the Implicit Association Test, which 
behavioral psychologists agree cannot diagnose bias reliably enough to distinguish its presence and 
force with any precision among individuals. See, e.g., Jerry Kang & Kristin Lane, Seeing Through 
Colorblindness: Implicit Bias and the Law, 58 UCLA L. Rev. 465, 477−80 (2010). 
 75. See Tara L. Mitchell et al., Racial Bias in Mock Juror Decision-Making: A Meta-Analytic 
Review of Defendant Treatment, 29 L. & Hum. Behav. 621, 625, 627−28 (2005) (analyzing thirty-four 
juror verdict studies and sixteen juror sentencing studies that employed the experimental manipulation 
of a defendant’s race). 
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method of fathoming”76 whether a prospective juror “has an unbiased 
mind.”77 Yet much in the law still treats jurors who can “reach a verdict 
as free from bias as possible” as the goal toward which jury trials should 
aspire, at least in theory.78
The problem with this aspiration is not just that a truly unbiased 
juror, like Hare’s hyper-rational archangel or Star Trek’s humanoid 
Spock, exists only in analytic philosophy or science fiction.
 
79 The decision 
maker who “strips himself of all predilections[] becomes a passionless 
thinking machine,” as Judge Jerome Frank once wrote about judges, and 
thereby “ceases to be human.”80 Courts have indeed recognized that it 
would be “unrealistic” to expect courts to empanel a jury composed of 
individuals who are tantamount to a tabula rasa, and accordingly “free 
from all” outside sources of mental influence.81
The problem is also that bias is “such an elusive condition of the 
mind,” as the Supreme Court has lamented, that “it is most difficult, if not 
impossible, to always recognize its existence.”
 
82
C. The Emerging Neuroscience of Bias 
 That prospective jurors 
cannot be trusted to disclose or perhaps even know their own biases 
leaves trial judges and lawyers in the precarious position of trying to read 
their minds in an effort to ascertain outside influences that might affect 
the jurors’ decisionmaking about the case. 
These attempts at mind reading that take place during voir dire are 
not new or strange. Although we cannot see what another person is 
thinking, we frequently attribute mental states like fear, anxiety, joy, and 
boredom to others by drawing inferences from what we perceive from 
one’s tone of voice, facial expression, or body language. Behavioral 
observation can be an unreliable gauge of mental states, however, because 
of its vulnerability to deceit and basic reliance on unsubstantiated hunches 
and folk psychology.83
 
 76. Aldridge v. United States, 283 U.S. 308, 313−14 n.3 (1931) (“[T]o ask a person whether he is 
[biased] . . . is, probably, the only sure method of fathoming his thoughts and feelings.” (quoting 
People v. Reyes, 5 Cal. 347, 349 (1855)). 
 Even the most reliable available psychological 
 77. Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 217 n.7 (1982) (“[S]urely [a juror] who is trying . . . to live up to 
the sanctity of his oath is well qualified to say whether he has an unbiased mind.”) (quoting Dennis v. 
United States, 339 U.S. 162, 171 (1950)). 
 78. In re Adams, 421 F. Supp. 1027, 1030 (D.C. Mich. 1976). 
 79. See James J. Gobert, In Search of the Impartial Jury, 79 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 269, 324 
(1988) (arguing that the illusion of jurors who are impartial in the sense that they are without bias 
“may be worth preserving” to sustain “[p]ublic confidence in the legal system”). 
 80. In re J.P. Linahan, Inc., 138 F.2d 650, 652−53 (2d Cir. 1943). 
 81. Commonwealth v. Johnson, 305 A.2d 5, 8 (Pa. 1973). 
 82. Smith, 455 U.S. at 231 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (quoting Crawford v. United States, 212 U.S. 
183, 196 (1909)). 
 83. See Morris B. Hoffman, Peremptory Challenges Should Be Abolished: A Trial Judge’s 
Perspective, 64 U. Chi. L. Rev. 809, 840, 863 (1997). 
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measures like the Implicit Association Test (“IAT”) cannot detect bias 
with any precision at the individual level.84
Because such tools cannot discern “the precise psychological 
processes through which the influence of” factors deemed irrelevant to a 
decisionmaking context “occur[] in the legal context,” these tools have 
been unable to answer a number of fundamental questions about the 
control and manifestation of bias.
 
85 To wit: To what extent, and under 
which conditions, can people control biases? Why do so many people fail 
to control the very biases that they claim to reject on reflection? Why can 
some people control those biases better than others?86 These are among 
the kinds of questions about bias that neuroscience has begun to answer.87
I must begin by underscoring how preliminary this research is, 
especially in view of the complexity of the mental processes at issue. Many 
of these studies suppose a misrepresentative one-to-one correlation 
between neural activity in a particular area of the brain and a mental 
state that the activity is said to represent. But the neural activity 
responsible for most mental states is in fact distributed across several 
different areas of the brain.
 
88
In the case of automatic biases, researchers have identified as crucial 
the amygdala, which comprises a pair of small, almond-sized brain areas 
normally associated with subconscious processing like fear conditioning, 
memory retrieval, and emotional learning.
 
89 But singling out automatic 
bias is not as simple as identifying whether a person’s amygdala lights up 
when she is shown relevant stimuli. This is in part because other parts of 
the brain are also involved in the operation of the same processes, 
including the anterior cingulated cortex, medial temporal lobe, and 
fusiform face area.90
 
 84. See Kang et al., supra note 74, at 1129−33; see also Justin D. Levinson & Danielle Young, 
Different Shades of Bias: Skin Tone, Implicit Racial Bias, and Judgments of Ambiguous Evidence, 112 W. 
Va. L. Rev. 307, 336−39 (2010) (arguing that implicit racial bias explains the statistically significant 
difference that the subtle manipulation of skin color made in mock juror perceptions of defendant guilt, 
even when subjects could not recall the defendant’s race); Jeffrey J. Rachlinski et al., Does Unconscious 
Racial Bias Affect Trial Judges?, 84 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1195, 1226−31 (2009) (canvassing studies that 
use the Implicit Association Test (“IAT”) and similar psychological measures to argue that certain people 
are sometimes able to control the kind of automatic bias that operates unconsciously). 
 
 85. Samuel R. Sommers, Race and the Decision Making of Juries, 12 Legal & Criminological 
Psychol. 171, 172 (2007). 
 86. See generally, Emily Pronin, Perception and Misperception of Bias in Human Judgment, 
11 Trends Cognitive Sci. 37 (2007) (explaining why people often fail to report their own bias). 
 87. See generally David M. Amodio & Kyle G. Ratner, The Neuroscience of Social Cognition, in 
The Oxford Handbook of Social Cognition 702 (Donald E. Carlston ed., 2013). 
 88. See, e.g., id. at 703−04. 
 89. See, e.g., Elizabeth A. Phelps et al., Performance on Indirect Measures of Race Evaluation 
Predicts Amygdala Activation, 12 J. Cognitive Neuroscience 729, 729−30 (2000). 
 90. See Austen Krill & Steven M. Platek, In-Group and Out-Group Membership Mediates Anterior 
Cingulate Activation to Social Exclusion, 1 Frontiers Evolutionary Neuroscience 1, 6 (2009). 
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Functional brain imaging over time (as opposed to static structural 
imaging) measures certain changes in the brainlike blood flows or 
electrical waveswhile a subject is engaged in a particular cognitive or 
motor activity or experiences a particular emotional or mental state.91 
Social neuroscientists Elizabeth Phelps and Alan Hart were the first to 
use functional magnetic resonance imaging (“fMRI”) to observe the 
increased levels of blood oxygen that flow to brain regions associated 
with certain attitudes or stereotypes while subjects were subliminally 
presented with the faces of people from races other than their own.92
An fMRI registers brain activity indirectly by observing increases in 
blood flow to deliver needed oxygen to active neurons.
 
93 More precisely, 
the influx of oxygenated blood is thought to point to parts of the brain 
that require the recovery of lost oxygen due to performance of neural 
activity immediately prior, as indicated by those higher oxygen levels.94 
The blood flow that fMRI measures is a delayed proxy for certain kinds 
of neural activity, and even then at poor spatial resolution.95
Whatever window fMRI provides into mental states accordingly 
comes “through a scanner darkly.”
 
96 The workings of the human mind 
are so complex that there might never be a brain imaging technology 
capable of predicting with reliability or confidence the effect of particular 
outside mental influences on a person’s decisionmaking about the legal 
issues at trial.97 Some neuroscientists nevertheless believe that brain 
imaging might be able to improve our ability to uncover outside sources 
of mental influence because neural scans might be able to uncover—
better than behavioral observation or reaction-time tests could—whether 
jurors are lying, even to themselves, about the influences that affect the 
way they think and the decisions they make.98
Current neuroscience research into bias chiefly concerns attitudes and 
stereotypes about race. These studies suggest that the extent to which a 
person who holds an unwanted racial bias can control it has to do with her 
 
 
 91. See John C. Gore, Principles and Practice of Functional MRI of the Human Brain, 112 J. 
Clinical Investigation 4, 4 (2003). 
 92. See Phelps et al., supra note 89, at 730; Allen J. Hart et al., Differential Response in the 
Human Amygdala to Racial Outgroup vs lngroup Face Stimuli, 11 NeuroReport 2351, 2351−52 (2000). 
 93. Elizabeth M.C. Hillman, Coupling Mechanism and Significance of the BOLD Signal: A Status 
Report, 37 Ann. Rev. Neuroscience (forthcoming 2014).  
 94. Id. 
 95. See, e.g., David M. Amodio et al., Neural Signals for the Detection of Unintentional Race Bias, 
15 Psychol. Sci. 88, 92−93 (2004) (discussing the anterior cingulate and prefrontal cortex regions of 
the brain in association with the conflict detection and regulatory systems). 
 96. Teneille Brown & Emily Murphy, Through a Scanner Darkly: Functional Neuroimaging as 
Evidence of a Criminal Defendant’s Past Mental States, 62 Stan. L. Rev. 1119, 1119 (2010). 
 97. See Emily R. Murphy & Henry T. Greely, What Will Be the Limits of Neuroscience-Based 
Mindreading in the Law?, in Oxford Handbook of Neuroethics 635, 642 (Judy Illes & Barbara J. 
Sahakian eds., 2011). 
 98. See Robert J. Sternberg, Cognitive Psychology 41−42, 47−48 (5th ed. 2009). 
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reasons for wanting to control that bias once it becomes apparent.99 What 
matters is whether her desire to control it owes more to external reasons 
for avoiding disapproval than it does to internal reasons stemming from 
personal values.100 Experiments with fMRI reveal differences in a 
person’s brain activity when her effort to control bias is more externally 
motivated, as when she knows that she is being watched within a racially 
salient decisionmaking context, than when her effort is more internally 
motivated, as when race is less salient and she believes that no one else is 
looking.101 Neuroscientists have found that the frontal brain regions that 
govern cognitive inhibition and executive function processes exert 
demonstrably less activity when primarily internally motivated subjects, 
who are far more successful at controlling bias than their externally 
motivated counterparts, engage in control strategies such as reappraisal 
and detachment.102
Building on this research, one striking recent study used fMRI 
analysis to predict the impact of racial bias on jury verdicts “more 
effectively” than behavioral or psychological measures.
 
103 Brain imaging 
enabled researchers to predict with greater accuracy than the IAT how 
much money nineteen subjects (all of them white) would award victims 
of different races in an otherwise identical employment discrimination 
case.104 The mock jurors read short vignettes about an employment 
discrimination case and reported the amount of money they would award 
the victims.105 The subjects thereafter took the IAT and their brains were 
scanned with the fMRI while they looked at black and white faces paired 
with positive and negative adjectives.106
The researchers who designed that study looked at neural activity in 




 99. See Sarah Banks et al., Amygdala-frontal Connectivity During Emotion Regulation, 2 Soc. 
Cognitive & Affective Neuroscience 303, 303 (2007) (discussing involvement of frontal cortical 
regions in modulating amygdale reactivity and mediating emotion regulation). 
 
Having identified a strong correlation between award size and neural 
activity, but no such correlation between verdict size and IAT scores, 
 100. See Patricia G. Devine & Lindsay B. Sharp, Automaticity and Control in Stereotyping and 
Prejudice, in Handbook of Prejudice, Stereotyping, and Discrimination 61, 77−80 (Todd D. Nelson 
ed., 2009). 
 101. See, e.g., Sam J. Gilbert et al., Evaluative vs. Trait Representation in Intergroup Social Judgments: 
Distinct Roles of Anterior Temporal Lobe and Prefrontal Cortex, 50 Neuropsychologia 3600, 3609 (2012). 
 102. See, e.g., Kevin N. Ochsner & James J. Gross, Cognitive Emotion Regulation: Insights from 
Social Cognitive and Affective Neuroscience, 17 Current Directions Psychol. Sci. 153, 154−57 (2008). 
 103. Harrison A. Korn et al., Neurolaw: Differential Brain Activity for Black and White Faces 
Predicts Damage Awards in Hypothetical Employment Discrimination Cases, 7 Soc. Neuroscience 
398, 398−99, 407 (2012). 
 104. See id. at 400, 404. 
 105. See id. at 400−01. 
 106. See id. at 400−02. 
 107. Id. at 404 (assessing the right inferior frontal gyrus and superior/middle parietal lobule). 
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they contended “that neuroimaging data can measure a racial bias . . . 
reflected in juror decisions more effectively than . . . the IAT.”108 The 
researchers expressly rejected the suggestion “that potential jurors be 
put in an magnetic resonance imaging (“MRI”) machine during jury 
selection for cases where race is salient.”109 But why not embrace neuro-
voir dire if it were suitably reliable and feasible to implement?110
II.  Brain Imaging and Juror Bias 
 
The early state of this bias research warrants the “neuromodesty” 
that Stephen Morse cautions in drawing legal conclusions.111
The case in which the Supreme Court extended the impartiality 
mandate from criminal to civil trials involved an equal protection 
challenge to the use of peremptory strikes against potential jurors based 
on race.
 But we 
should not fail to draw lessons from brain imaging studies to the extent 
that they supply well-supported theories or push us to think in new ways 
about the law. 
112 Litigant participation in the selection of jurors promotes the 
perception of legitimacy, but trading on “race stereotypes” exacts too 
high a price, Justice Kennedy held for the Court, “for acceptance of a 
jury panel as fair.”113 Justice Kennedy explained that “if a litigant 
believes that [a] prospective juror harbors” any outside influence that 
renders him biased, “the issue can be explored in a rational way.”114
This Part imagines a neuroscientifically rational way to detect and 
eliminate such outside influences during jury selection. It argues that 
adoption of this neuro-voir dire is worth resisting because it carries to full 
expression the bankrupt concept of monolithic bias that much of our jury 
doctrine and theory presupposes. 
 
A. Neuro-Voir Dire 
The emerging neuroscience discussed in Part I invites a thought 
experiment to evaluate the monolithic conception of bias that is included 
in any outside source of juror influence. Imagine if brain imaging were 
developed to the point at which it could reliably identify prospective 
 
 108. Id. at 407. Beyond the usual methodological problems with applying the results of mock jury 
studies to real-world trial settings, the study’s use of a small and homogenous sample cautions against 
making too much of its findings. See id. 
 109. Id. 
 110. Apart from fMRI’s insufficiently proven reliability to detect bias, the authors give as reasons 
just that “[t]he cost of doing so would be prohibitive, many people might feel it is overly invasive, and 
. . . courts have been hesitant to allow neuroimaging data to be used in trials.” Id. 
 111. See generally Stephen J. Morse, Avoiding Irrational NeuroLaw Exuberance: A Plea for 
Neuromodesty, 62 Mercer L. Rev. 837 (2011) (addressing claims about criminal responsibility). 
 112. Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 628−29 (1991). 
 113. Id. at 630. 
 114. Id. at 631.  
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jurors who arrive at trial affected by any extra-trial influence that 
appears relevant to the case. Courts could then use this perfect 
technology of bias detection, referred to as neuro-voir dire, to weed out 
individuals who harbor any outside influence with enough strength as it 
relates to a particular trial. 
This analytic invention is designed, like Plato’s cave, Descartes’s evil 
demon, and Hobbes’ state of nature, to provoke a new way to think 
about an old problem.115 Neuro-voir dire occasions us in a fresh and 
powerful way to ask whether the juror who lacks “any prepossessions 
whatever” would be so “extremely desirable,” as Chief Justice Marshall 
put it in Burr, that such a juror, however fictional, stands as the model 
toward which jury selection and trial procedures should aspire.116 Would 
the adoption of brain imaging techniques that could detect jury bias hold 
the appeal that much of the impartiality jurisprudence assumes?117
Whatever hesitation we would have about neuro-voir dire cannot lie 
just in the fact that brain imaging is, for now, too expensive or 
cumbersome to administer. It is true that the $500 or so that it costs to 
perform a brain image today makes it impossible to scan every person 
called for jury service.
 
118 The price may, however, come down over time. 
Logistics pose another challenge. The fMRI machine, for example, 
requires subjects to lie still inside a large magnet.119 Yet scientists are 
developing wireless neuroimaging that does not require such restriction 
of movement.120
Prospective jurors might still of course balk at the prospect of brain 
imaging at the courthouse. But foot dragging alone would hardly be 
sufficient reason to abandon measures that vindicate the constitutional 
guarantee of jury impartiality. If we suppose that neuroimaging could 
detect bias reliably, affordably, and conveniently, what explains the 
lingering unease that its adoption would inspire? The most obvious 
objection is that brain scanning jurors might infringe upon their cognitive 
privacy. The next Subpart examines that plausible but unsatisfying 
privacy-based objection to neuro-voir dire. 
 
 
 115. See Dennett, supra note 29, at 6. 
 116. United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 49, 50−51 (C.C.D. Va. 1807) (No. 14,692g). 
 117. See supra notes 17−20, 40−43 and accompanying text. 
 118. See Cost & Billing, Univ. Mich. fMRI Lab., http://fmri.research.umich.edu/users/billing.php 
(last visited Apr. 24, 2014). 
 119. See generally Douglas C. Noll, A Primer on MRI and Functional MRI (Dep’t of Biomed. 
Eng’g & Radiology, Univ. Mich., No. 2.1, 2001), available at http://web.eecs.umich.edu/~dnoll/ 
primer2.pdf. 
 120. See, e.g., Yoko Hoshi et al., Movable Cognitive Studies with a Portable, Telemetric Near-
Infrared Spectroscopy System, 13 NeuroImage S18, S18 (2001) (noting that it is unclear whether such 
wireless imaging will enable measures of brain activity that are as precise as fMRI). 
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B. Juror Privacy Interests 
Citizens who are called for jury service enjoy a qualified privacy 
right against being forced to disclose certain personal information, even 
if only to the inquiring trial lawyer or judge.121 Juror privacy interests 
vary as a function of, first, the sensitivity of the information that is being 
solicited and, second, its materiality to concerns about bias on the jury.122 
Only if material information cannot be obtained less intrusively have 
juror privacy interests been held to yield to a defendant’s right to an 
impartial jury.123 Consider, for example, that federal law bars a juror’s 
“exclusion from service” on the basis of religion.124 But questions that go 
to her faith or affiliation are permitted if a religious figure or institution 
is a party, witness, or victim, or where the juror’s religion appears likely 
to figure prominently at trial, as in prosecutions for polygamy or 
abortion, for example.125
On this account, neuro-voir dire appears to pose a serious threat to 
juror privacy. Brain scanning could reveal sensitive personal information, 
after all, that a person would not wish to share or may not even yet know 
to be true. This privacy concern about forced brain imaging for bias goes 
beyond discovering information that traditional juror questioning and 
observation cannot. I have argued in the self-incrimination context that 
the content of private information matters less than control over “the use 
and disclosure of [one’s] thoughts.”
 
126
This concept of mental control is the best way to think about 
cognitive privacy interests in the context of jury selection. Even if the 
court does not disclose whatever information that brain imaging gleans, 
neuro-voir dire risks unwanted access to representations of the subjective 
beliefs that “anchor each of us as an individual person with an 
uninterrupted autobiographical narrative.”
 
127 Our individual identities 
quite plausibly comprise little more than the memories and experiences 
that make up the patchwork of our potentially scannable thoughts—what 
most of us “think of as most important about who we are.”128
But the stakes differ between criminal suspects and potential jurors. 
In the Fifth Amendment context, the point of brain imaging would be to 
 
 
 121. United States v. Workman, 454 F.2d 1124, 1128−29 (9th Cir. 1971), reh’g denied, 409 U.S. 857 
(1972). 
 122. A distinct dimension of juror privacy, less relevant to my inquiry, concerns how widely that 
information is disclosed. E.g., United States v. Barnes, 604 F.2d 121, 140−41 (2d Cir. 1979). 
 123. See, e.g., Paula L. Hannaford, Safeguarding Juror Privacy: A New Framework for Court 
Policies and Procedures, 85 Judicature 18, 23 (2001). 
 124. 28 U.S.C. § 1862 (2003). 
 125. See State v. Barnett, 445 P.2d 124, 125 (Ore. 1968). 
 126. Fox, supra note 26, at 796. 
 127. Id. 
 128. Id. at 796−97. For a critique of my position, see Kiel Brennan-Marquez, A Modest Defense of 
Mind Reading, 15 Yale J.L. & Tech. 214, 257−58, 262−64 (2013). 
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supply evidence about whether a person committed a crime. For the 
Sixth Amendment, by contrast, it is to determine whether a person’s state 
of mind qualifies her to serve at trial. With the right to silence at stake, the 
chief state interest is solving crime; with impartiality, it is securing a fair 
trial.129 So for self-incrimination, conviction and punishment loom over 
brain scanning. In the case of bias, the threatened consequence is being 
dismissed from the jury.130
No less in jury selection than criminal interrogations, however, does 
compelled brain imaging imperil the individual’s mental control. 
Ordinary voir dire leaves a person free to refuse to disclose intimate 
details; she need simply not answer the questions.
 
131 Neuro-voir dire 
deprives her of that choice, by contrast, because it extracts visual pictures 
meant to represent her “inner sanctum of individual feeling and thought,” 
as the Supreme Court has put it in the self-incrimination context.132
Yet a juror’s privacy interests in her “mental control” fails to capture, 
at least fully or convincingly, the unwillingness that many share to accept 
brain imaging for all juror bias, even if it is safe, noninvasive, and reliable. 
In the context of jury selection, privacy interests are declined the 
constitutional status of the impartiality right that voir dire seeks to 
vindicate. 
 
It is true that juror privacy interests weigh more heavily in civil cases 
than criminal cases. The loss of liberty that criminal prosecution 
threatens to a defendant makes her impartiality right more critical in that 
context. But even in civil trials, the Supreme Court has declined 
constitutional status to the juror privacy interest in ways that cannot 
override the decidedly constitutional right to an impartial jury.133
That cognitive privacy does not provide a dispositive reason to resist 
neuro-voir dire for all outside influences suggests that this high-tech 
practice resembles the low-tech methods of bias detection that we accept. 
Whether interrogation of potential jurors takes the form of oral 
interviews, computer questionnaires, IATs, or brain imaging, it aims all 
the same to “eliminat[e] [the] extremes of partiality on both sides.”
 
134
C. Rethinking the Analogy 
 
If not privacy-based concerns about mental control, what is the 
relevant moral or legal difference between crude and sophisticated 
 
 129. See Ronald J. Allen, Theorizing Self-Incrimination, 30 Cardozo L. Rev. 729, 732, 736−37 
(2008) (arguing that privacy interests permit compelled disclosures from criminal suspects). 
 130. The brain-scanned juror may also risk revealing sensitive proclivities or prejudices. 
 131. Brandborg v. Lucas, 891 F. Supp. 352, 360 (E.D. Tex. 1995). 
 132. United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225, 233 (1975) (quoting Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 
85, 90–91 (1974)). 
 133. See Press-Enter. Co. v. Superior Court, 464 U.S. 501, 511 (1984). 
 134. Holland v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 474, 484 (1990) (quoting Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 219 (1965)). 
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measures of getting at juror biases?135 To put the question another way: 
assuming there is nothing wrong with asking potential jurors, whether in 
words or writing, about their personal habits or convictions, why should we 
worry about like-minded attempts that enlist novel brain-based means?136
Neuro-voir dire does not in fact represent any radical departure 
from existing jury selection practices. This resemblance does not, 
however, justify a futuristic method by appeal to the familiar. Instead, it 
gives reason to reevaluate the monolithic conception of juror bias that 
animates both. Neuro-voir dire is troubling because it draws out the full 
implications of treating all outside sources of juror influence the same. 
 
We have not until now been forced to confront those implications 
because when it comes to juror bias, “it is most difficult, if not impossible, 
to always recognize its existence.”137 We have seen how jurors can be as 
oblivious to the automatic bias they harbor as they are good at hiding 
deliberative bias.138 Even voir dire’s defenders concede that its reliance 
on the assessment of jurors’ voluntary responses and demeanor leaves 
judges and lawyers bound to miss many of the “biases and opinions that 
will inevitably influence their decisions and perceptions.”139
But neuro-voir dire suffers from no such epistemic shortcomings. 
This neurotechnological means of identifying jury bias wholesale would 
make only “more opaque and obscure” the complexity of those outside 
influences that its adoption seeks to uproot.
 
140 “When a machine runs 
efficiently,” after all, “one need focus only on its inputs and outputs and 
not on its internal complexity.”141
The term bias sweeps so broadly in the doctrine and literature that 
no uniform approach that conceives of every such “extrajudicial 
source”
 
142 of “outside influence”143
 
 135. Cf. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 963−64 (2012) (comparing suspect privacy interests 
at stake in police tracking through routine tailing via car versus space-based satellite navigation). 
 the same way could preserve the 
appropriate balance between the objective and subjective ideals of the 
jury. The preoccupations and parochialisms through which jurors’ minds 
filter the testimony at trial vary not just in terms of whether those biases 
operate consciously or resist control, but in terms of their moral valence 
and reflection of social mores. Bigotry should not be treated like 
 136. See supra text accompanying notes 119−120. 
 137. Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 231 (1982) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (quoting Crawford v. 
United States, 212 U.S. 183, 196 (1909)). 
 138. See, e.g., Mary R. Rose & Shari Seidman Diamond, Judging Bias: Juror Confidence and 
Judicial Rulings on Challenges for Cause, 42 Law & Soc’y Rev. 513, 516−17 (2008). 
 139. Barbara Allen Babcock, Voir Dire: Preserving “Its Wonderful Power”, 27 Stan. L. Rev. 545, 
551 (1975). 
 140. Bruno Latour, Pandora’s Hope: Essays on the Reality of Science Studies 304 (1999). 
 141. Id. 
 142. Vermeule, supra note 40, at 403 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 143. Patterson v. Colorado, 205 U.S. 454, 462 (1907). 
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empathy, nor personal vendettas like regional values. That we would 
reject neuro-voir dire presses us to see that the impartiality mandate 
requires more than the absence of whatever bias is taken to mean. 
Neuro-voir dire, no less than ordinary voir dire, is misguided for the 
reason and to the extent that it treats every outside source of juror 
influence the same way and thus fails to appreciate important moral 
differences among them. What we need is a more precise way to think 
and talk about the multiplicity of the outside mental influences on 
potential jurors that go by the name of bias. 
III.  The Cognitive Bias Spectrum 
This Part develops a novel conceptual framework with which to 
evaluate those biases that find the most prominent expression in jury law 
and theory. This Article distinguishes four categories of outside 
influence. What I call personal interests comprise the self-regarding kinds 
of influence that arise when the outcome in a case has implications for 
the welfare of a juror’s family or fortune. Community interests consist of 
local area norms that a juror identifies with, or expectations in the region 
affected by the dispute with which he feels pressure to conform. Case-
specific beliefs spring from juror exposure to out-of-court facts or rumors 
about the particular people or events at trial. Case-general beliefs are 
attitudes about social groups or ideologies that bear relevance to the trial 
more broadly. 
Unraveling the monolith of bias along this spectrum of cognitive 
biases helps to reconcile the objective and subjective ideals of the jury. I 
argue that trial courts can vindicate the objective ideal of the jury by 
expanding the grounds for exclusion for cause to cover two categories of 
juror bias: personal interests in the case, whether social or financial, and 
case-specific beliefs arising from pretrial facts or rumors about the 
parties or events. The subjective ideal of the jury in turn calls for greater 
solicitude with respect to community interests and case-general beliefs 
about broadly relevant social groups or causes. Rather than questioning 
jurors regarding these categories of bias, I would implement several bias-
tempering mechanisms to mitigate the accompanying risk that juries 
would refuse to follow the law, be unable to agree on a verdict, or permit 
unjust considerations to influence their decisionmaking. 
A. Vindicating the Objective Ideal 
The objective ideal of the jury is of recent vintage. Until the 
eighteenth century, trials were decided by jurors already familiar with 
the dispute being litigated.144
 
 144. See e.g., John Marshall Mitnick, From Neighbor-Witness to Judge of Proofs: The 
Transformation of the English Civil Juror, 32 Am. J. Legal Hist. 201, 206−29 (1988). 
 Jurors were chosen precisely because of 
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their prior knowledge of the events or about the people at issue.145 That 
prerevolutionary vision of jurors prized their acquaintance with the 
parties and their conflict.146 The institution that we know as the jury was 
forged in opposition to the model of jurors as witness-neighbors.147 The 
American tradition seeks jurors who are unfamiliar with the people or 
events at trial.148
Information about the case that is not admitted into evidence, 
whether acquired through social media or word of mouth, uniformly 
erodes the requisite balance of objectivity on the jury. Exposure to such 
fact or rumor that so closely resembles the evidence presented at trial 
does not simply cloud or confound jurors’ consideration of that evidence 
but risks supplanting it altogether and thus depriving the parties of the 
opportunity for cross-examination, which courts have long regarded as 
the “greatest legal engine ever invented for the discovery of truth.”
 
149 
Mistrust of exposure to out-of-court rumor and publicity is in this sense 
similar to the epistemic and unfairness rationales for excluding evidence 
such as hearsay and perhaps prior misconduct.150
There is a second category of outside influence whose presence 
should, without exception, disqualify a juror when it appears with 
sufficient force. The impartiality mandate requires not just ignorance of 
facts beyond the testimony. It also insists that jurors stand at a certain 
distance from the people and matters involved. Even the “self-
informing” jury excluded prospective jurors who were related to the 
parties or had property riding on the outcome.
 The constitutional 
bedrock that jurors come to a trial relatively unaware of the facts 
explains why the jury doctrine rightly resists, wholesale, this category of 
biases that I refer to as case-specific beliefs. 
151
A juror who herself is a party to a case is paradigmatic of what I call 
personal interests. It is a “mainstay of our system of government,” the 
Supreme Court asserts, that “[n]o man is allowed to be a judge in his own 
 Social affections or 
stock holdings breed the self-serving conflicts of interest that explain why 
bribes and threats so corrupt jury decisionmaking. 
 
 145. See, e.g., Steven A. Engel, The Public’s Vicinage Right: A Constitutional Argument, 75 N.Y.U. L. 
Rev. 1658, 1674 (2000) (arguing that citizens who possessed personal knowledge of the events that gave 
rise to the legal dispute, and consequently were thought to be best positioned to adjudicate it). 
 146. See, e.g., S. Union Co. v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2344, 2353 (2012). 
 147. See, e.g., Michael C. Dorf, Spandrel or Frankenstein’s Monster? The Vices and Virtues of 
Retrofitting in American Law, 54 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 339, 341 (2012). 
 148. See Engel, supra note 145, at 1693 (noting that “modern courts disfavor jurors with specific 
knowledge of the parties or the crime”). 
 149. United States v. Evans, 216 F.3d 80, 85 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (quoting California v. Green, 399 U.S. 
149, 158 (1970)). 
 150. Cf. Richard D. Friedman, Minimizing the Jury Over-Valuation Concern, 2003 Mich. St. L. 
Rev. 967, 967−68 (arguing that the dominant reason that evidence law excludes hearsay, character, and 
prior misconduct evidence is a fear that juries will value it too highly). 
 151. See Daniel Klerman, Was the Jury Ever Self-Informing?, 77 S. Cal. L. Rev. 123, 133−34 (2003). 
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cause, because his interest would certainly bias his judgment.”152 Even a 
scholar like Adrian Vermeule, who has argued that institutional designers 
often do well to depart from the axiom against deciding one’s own case, 
champions “rules for selecting petit juries [that] exclude jurors” with any 
such personal interests.153
1. Personal Interests 
 
First consider the personal interests that pull at jurors’ heart and 
purse strings. Personal interests relate to a potential juror’s social or 
economic ties to a party or other prominent participant in the trial. There 
is a core of this self-regard within concentric circles that extends outward, 
from standing in judgment of one’s family or friends, to deciding cases 
that implicate gradually attenuated professional or pecuniary stakes.154 
These conflicts of interest subvert the measure of objectivity required for 
a juror’s even-handed application of the facts to the law.155
If the juror believes that the outcome in a case could impact her 
intimates or bank account, the impulse is to decide it in a way that helps 
her friend, hurts her enemy, preserves her wealth, grinds an axe, or 
indulges a grudge. Because “every man is presumed to do all things in 
order to his own benefit,” Thomas Hobbes wrote, “no man is a fit 




 The reason to weed out from the jury 
those personal interests located near the center is not just that they tend 
to be so persuasive, but also that they run roughshod over the objective 
ideal of the jury. 
Most of us enjoy relationships with family and friends whose well-
being matters to us. The presence or relevance of people like these 
within the context of trial predictably encourages jurors to displace the 
consideration of truth and justice with regard for self or loved ones.157 A 
juror’s relationship with a party, lawyer, victim, or witness naturally 
affects her thinking about that person’s arguments, testimony, or 
outcomes.158
Relatives and companions will of course tend to have a stronger pull 
than neighbors or colleagues. Brain imaging studies indeed confirm that 
 
 
 152. Gutierrez de Martinez v. Lamagno, 515 U.S. 417, 428 (1995) (citations omitted) (internal 
quotations marks omitted). 
 153. Vermeule, supra note 40, at 402. 
 154. Id. at 390−91. 
 155. See id. at 400 (discussing tradeoffs of efficiency, expertise, and independence). 
 156. Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan 102 (Michael Oakeshott ed., Macmillan 1947) (1651). 
 157. See, e.g., John A. Bargh & Erin L. Williams, The Automaticity of Social Life, 15 Current 
Directions Psychol. Sci. 1, 4 (2006). 
 158. See, e.g., Estrada v. Scribner, 512 F.3d 1227, 1241 (9th Cir. 2008). 
H - Fox_17 (M. STEVENS) (Do Not Delete) 5/26/2014 10:44 AM 
1024 HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 65:999 
people who have greater individual meaning are “more likely to [elicit] 
selective excitatory responses” than strangers or celebrities with whom 
we have only generalized familiarity.159
The point is not, however, that more wide-ranging or intense 
memories or involvement with another person will make it more likely 
that his prominent place at trial will “influence the information recalled” 




 It is that the 
influence of such personal interests characteristically disfigures the 
conditions required for objective decisionmaking. 
A second kind of personal interest arises under circumstances in 
which a potential juror or her close relation has a nontrivial monetary 
stake in how the case is resolved. A juror who holds stock in a corporation 
that is a named party, for example, would thereby have financial interests 
in the case that a juror who uses that corporation’s products would not.161 
Similar financial interests arise for an employee or clerk, landlord or 
tenant, principal or agent, debtor or creditor, business partner or surety 
on any bond to either party. As the prospect of fiscal reward increases—
due to the larger or more direct pecuniary incentives at stake—the 
release of dopamine to the reward system of the brain also increases in a 
way that is similar to that of people who are addicted to a controlled drug 
respond to its use.162
The Supreme Court, “while recognizing that persons of the ‘highest 
honor and greatest self-sacrifice’ would not be influenced by fear of 
financial losses, has said that . . . ‘[such] temptation to the average man as 




 159. Indre V. Viskontas et al., Human Medial Temporal Lobe Neurons Respond Preferentially to 
Personally Relevant Images, 106 Proc. Nat’l Acad. Sci. 21329, 21331 (2009) . 
 What makes such 
interests corrosive of the kinds of jurors we want is not that they tend to 
exert such great psychological influence, but that the self-regarding logic 
they promote collides with the provision of other-regarding justice. Some 
jurors may be less personally interested, however, by contrast to the rule 
 160. Alisha C. Holland & Elizabeth A. Kensinger, Review: Emotion and Autobiographical 
Memory, 7 Physics Life Rev. 88, 88 (2010). 
 161. See, e.g., Chestnut v. Ford Motor Co., 445 F.2d 967, 971 (4th Cir. 1971) (“That a stockholder 
in a company which is a party to a lawsuit is incompetent to sit as juror is so well settled as to be black 
letter law.”). 
 162. Hans C. Breiter et al., Functional Imaging of Neural Responses to Expectancy and Experience 
of Monetary Gains and Losses, 30 Neuron 619, 634 (2001). 
 163. Dennis v. United States, 339 U.S. 162, 176 (1950) (Black, J., dissenting) (quoting Tumey v. 
Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 532 (1927)). 
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of necessity that authorizes judges to determine the constitutionality of 
changes to their salaries.164
2. Case-Specific Beliefs 
 
A distinct source of outside influence arises under conditions in 
which a potential juror has (or believes she has) knowledge of or 
familiarity with information related to the case that was not admitted at 
trial. Such information might be acquired either through direct 
experience with the events or people at trial or through social rumor, 
media reports, or exposure to earlier proceedings in the case or another 
between the same parties.165 This is the kind of bias that defense attorney 
Don West alluded to when in his opening statement he began: “Knock-
knock. Who’s there? George Zimmerman. George Zimmerman, who? 
Alright good. You’re on the jury.”166
What makes case-specific beliefs such as antecedent knowledge 
about the defendant so disquieting is not just that their resemblance to 
the evidence at trial makes jurors especially susceptible to influence. 
Experimental studies have demonstrated the frequently significant 
influence that inadmissible information about a party or events has on 
juror thinking.
 
167 Beyond the distinctive power to persuade, however, case-
specific beliefs are predictably one-sided and undermine the objective 
ideal by depriving the side that they skew against of the opportunity to 
contest their truth in the court of law.168
Justice Kennedy has usefully divided the relevant precedents 
regarding what I call case-specific beliefs into two categories. First are 
cases involving the narrow propagation of those beliefs; second are those 
involving the pervasive kind of exposure that creates an “atmosphere so 
corruptive of the trial process that . . . a fair trial could not be held 




 164. See, e.g., United States v. Will, 449 U.S. 200, 215 (1980). For further discussion, see Vermeule, 
supra note 
 
40, at 408−09. 
 165. See Leonard v. United States, 378 U.S. 544, 544 (1964) (per curiam) (reversing conviction because a 
juror had heard announcement of defendant’s guilty verdict on similar charges in an earlier trial). 
 166. Adam Goldberg, George Zimmerman’s Lawyer Tells ‘Knock-Knock’ Joke at Trial, 
Huffington Post (June 24, 2013, 1:45 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/06/24/george-
zimmerman-knock-knock_n_3491367.html; see Mike Schneider, George Zimmerman Trial: Social 
Media Infiltrates Trial, Huffington Post (July 7, 2013, 10:27 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/ 
2013/07/07/george-zimmerman-trial-social-media-infiltrates-trial_n_3557734.html. 
 167. See, e.g., Christina A. Studebaker & Steven D. Penrod, Pretrial Publicity: The Media, the Law, 
and Common Sense, 3 Psychol. Pub. Pol’y & L. 428, 436−37 (1997). 
 168. See supra note 150 and accompanying text. 
 169. Mu’Min v. Virginia, 500 U.S. 415, 448 (1991) (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
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a. Narrow 
Courts determine the suitability of narrow case-specific beliefs on a 
juror-by-juror basis by reference to the content and acquisition of 
information about the people or events at trial.170 Content-based inquiry 
goes to how directly that information relates to the case and whether it 
communicates opinion rather than fact.171 As to its acquisition, courts ask 
how recently the exposure took place and how reliable its source is 
perceived to be.172
Even “brief exposure” to case-specific information can entrench 
beliefs about guilt by generating an enduring lens through which jurors 
filter the evidence at trial.
 
173 It is more than “the difficulty of effacing 
prejudicial publicity from the minds of the jurors,” however, that 
explains why “trial courts must take strong measures to ensure that the 
balance is never weighed against the accused.”174
b. Pervasive 
 Case-specific beliefs 
should disqualify jurors not because they persuade but because they 
distort consideration of admissible evidence by masquerading as the kind 
of information about the facts and events that is subject to cross-
examination. 
Sometimes media reports or social conversation about a case 
permeates the affected geographic region across the board. A party may 
in such cases ask the court to move the area from which potential jurors 
are drawn or delay the trial to let memories of that exposure fade and 
attending passions subside.175 In high-profile cases that generate pretrial 
publicity—what Justice Kennedy called “atmospheric”—the Supreme 
Court has focused on these same two elements of case-specific beliefs.176 
First is its content. The Court has emphasized the reliable appearance 
and inflammatory nature of a defendant’s televised murder confession, 
for example, as a reason to reverse his conviction when his request for a 
change in venue was denied.177
What sets pervasive, case-specific beliefs apart from narrow beliefs 
is the breadth of exposure to those beliefs within a particular geographic 
area. With respect to this second dimension of pretrial publicity, courts 
 
 
 170. See Skilling v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 2896, 2915−17 (2010). 
 171. See United States v. Church, 217 F. Supp. 2d 696, 698 (W.D. Va. 2002). 
 172. See, e.g., United States v. Bakker, 925 F.2d 728, 732−33 (4th Cir. 1991). 
 173. See Dan Simon, In Doubt: The Psychology of the Criminal Justice Process 186 (2012) 
(explaining the “lingering impact” of discredited pretrial information on jurors’ beliefs about the case 
in terms of so-called hindsight bias, belief preservation, and coherence effects). 
 174. Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 362 (1966). 
 175. See Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 725 (1961). 
 176. Mu’Min v. Virginia, 500 U.S. 415, 448 (1991) (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
 177. See Rideau v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 723, 726−27 (1963). 
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highlight its saturation, frequency, and availability.178 Sporadic media 
exposure across a sprawling community is less problematic, on this 
account, than intensive exposure of case-specific facts “delivered 
regularly to approximately 95% of the dwellings” near which the 
litigated events took place, while “radio and TV stations . . . likewise 
blanketed” that same concentrated region from which the jury pool was 
selected.179
 
 The presence of these kinds of outside influences threatens an 
indispensable balance of objectivity among jurors. 
*** 
 Personal interests and case-specific beliefs so impair the objective 
ideal of the jury that deference to trial courts is misplaced in 
determinations about whether potential jurors affected by these sources 
of outside influence can serve impartially.180 That the impartiality inquiry 
is “not easily subject to appellate review” cannot reduce to empty 
rhetoric or rudderless confusion the constitutional imperative to curb the 
distorted impact of personal interests or case-specific beliefs on jury 
decisionmaking.181
There are two measures that trial courts should take to efface from 
the jury sufficiently strong personal interests and case-specific beliefs. 
First, courts could lower the standard for presuming a disqualifying bias, 
subject to rebuttal that a juror is impartial.
 
182
Exclusion should be more readily assumed for jurors who hold 
strong personal interests or case-specific beliefs. Individuals with strong 
connections or exposure to inadmissible information should be 
presumptively disqualified.
 Second, courts could 
require individualized questionnaires designed specifically to ascertain 
these pernicious sources of outside influence. 
183 The Supreme Court should use common 
law or a revision of the federal rules of procedure to lower the threshold 
for presumptive disqualification for personal interests and case-specific 
beliefs to the less demanding reasonable-likelihood-of-unfairness 
standard that it adopted only briefly in Sheppard v. Maxwell.184
 
 178. See Irvin, 366 U.S. at 725–27. 
 
 179. Id. at 725. 
 180. See, e.g., Skilling v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 2896, 2923 (2010) (explaining that “the deference 
due to district courts is at its pinnacle” in determinations about jury impartiality). 
 181. Rosales-Lopez v. United States, 451 U.S. 182, 188 (1981). 
 182. See United States v. Torres, 128 F.3d 38, 43–47 (2d Cir. 1997) (distinguishing bias that is 
admitted from that which is presumed from statutory criteria and bias that is inferred “when a juror 
discloses a fact that bespeaks a risk of partiality sufficiently significant to warrant granting the trial 
judge discretion to excuse the juror for cause, but not so great as to make mandatory a presumption of 
bias”); see also United States v. Thomas, 627 F.3d 146, 161 (5th Cir. 2010) (similar). 
 183. See Coughlin v. Tailhook Ass’n, 112 F.3d 1052, 1062 (9th Cir. 1997). 
 184. 384 U.S. 333, 363 (1966); 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (2014) (establishing a congressional approval 
requirement). 
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That this disqualification is presumptive and not absolute provides 
the opportunity for clarifying questioning in borderline cases in which 
personal interests or case-specific beliefs are arguably remote or 
attenuated under the particular circumstances. Follow-up voir dire in such 
limited cases should be individualized, sequestered, and open-ended if it 
is to realize its promise as an “effective method of rooting out” these 
objectionable categories of bias.185
Mandatory questionnaires should ask prospective jurors to disclose 
any pretrial acquaintance with the facts and any social or economic 
connections to the case. Such questionnaires would be time- and cost-
effective, easy to administer, and “superior to voir dire in obtaining [true 
and complete] answers to questions.”
 
186
These sources of mental influence are less susceptible to the 
vagaries of self-reported bias that plague voir dire more broadly. That is 
because people are usually aware of whether they have heard about 
events in the case, have a financial holding in its outcome, or a social 
relationship to the people involved. Nor are these the sensitive kinds of 
outside influence about social groups or ideologies that more often give 
jurors reason to conceal their views. Disclosure about which news 
sources a prospective juror uses or how she invests her money does not 
tend to be personal or embarrassing in the way that attitudes about race 
or politics might. 
 Live questioning that takes place 
in full view of judges, lawyers, and other prospective jurors might make 
people reticent to reveal personal interests or case-specific beliefs in a 
way that insulated surveys would not. 
As the Court insists, a potential juror’s cursory affirmation that she 
is impartial should not suffice to establish her qualification to serve.187 It 
is a mistake to decline to find reversible error when a trial judge declines, 
for example, to excuse from jury service a patient of the doctor who is 
sued for medical malpractice,188 an agent of a firm that insures personal 
injury defendants,189 a member of the same church as the mother of the 
decedent in a murder trial,190 or the employee of one local oil company in 
an action against its competitor.191
The judge’s appraisal in these cases of a “prospective juror’s 
inflection, sincerity, demeanor, candor, body language, and apprehension 




 185. Patton v. Yount, 467 U.S. 1025, 1038 n.13 (1984) (citation omitted). 
 Courts cannot trust a juror’s claim to 
 186. Joseph A. Colquitt, Using Jury Questionnaires; (Ab)using Jurors, 40 Conn. L. Rev. 1, 15–16 (2007). 
 187. Mu’Min v. Virginia, 500 U.S. 415, 439–41 (1991) (Marshall, J., dissenting).  
 188. Poynter v. Ratcliff, 874 F.2d 219, 221–22 (4th Cir. 1989). 
 189. Lusich v. Bloomfield S.S. Co., 355 F.2d 770, 775 (5th Cir. 1966). 
 190. Porter v. Illinois, 479 U.S. 898, 899 (1986) (Marshall, J., dissenting).  
 191. Marks v. Shell Oil Co., 895 F.2d 1128, 1130–31 (6th Cir. 1990). 
 192. Skilling v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 2896, 2918 (2010). 
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impartiality if she “admits exposure to pretrial publicity” or connection 
to a party without at least asking “what he has read or heard about the 
case” or how close that connection is in order to determine “what 
corresponding impressions he has formed.”193 The presence of personal 
interests or case-specific beliefs make it “likely that at least some of the 
seated jurors, despite stating that they could be fair, harbor[] similar 
biases that a more probing inquiry would likely have exposed.”194
B. Vindicating the Subjective Ideal 
 
Potential jurors are moved by more than protecting their families 
and wallets, and they harbor opinions about more than the events and 
people at trial. What I call community interests comprise the social goods 
and ills that a juror attributes to the broader community. Jurors can 
identify with the community or feel pressure to conform to its norms in 
ways that favor a particular side. These stakes may be clear to residents 
of that community, whether or not news media or social rumor convey 
case-specific information about the people and events. That such interests 
span a community’s “yearning to see justice done” and its “urge for 
retribution” after a conspicuous crime or scandal makes clear that it is as 
important to preserve some of these on the jury as it is to efface others.195
The moral complexity of such solidarities among jurors is also 
reflected in case-general beliefs about ideologies or affiliations. Ideological 
kinds of case-general beliefs range from mercy for a defendant subject to 
prosecutorial misconduct to spite for the one whose minor offense would 
qualify as the third strike under a recidivist statute. Neither ideological nor 
affiliative case-general beliefs are good or bad across the board, and are 
categorically worth preserving or uprooting. Compare racial stereotyping 
with understanding based on shared experiences. Bigotry infects the jury 
no less than empathy informs it.
 
196
These categories of bias are importantly distinct from those 
analyzed in the previous Subpart. Every personal interest or case-specific 
belief, at least when it is strong enough, corrodes the measure of 
objectivity that we demand from jurors, without loss to the kind of 
subjectivity that we at the same time expect. By contrast, community 
interests and case-general beliefs admit of certain influences that 
preserve the subjective element that jurors should bring to trial. That is, 
some community interests and case-general beliefs make up the sort of 
 These are two categories of bias whose 
careful accommodation among jurors serves to vindicate the subjective 
ideal of the jury. 
 
 193. Mu’Min v. Virginia, 500 U.S. 415, 441–43 (1991) (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
 194. Skilling, 130 S. Ct. at 2962 (Sotomayor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 195. Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 571 (1980). 
 196. See supra notes 136–141 and accompanying text. 
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common sense and life experience that our juries should not eschew, but 
prize. These classes of bias call for a more sophisticated approach—
beyond detecting and striking jurors who harbor them—that channels 
biases in constructive ways. 
1. Community Interests 
Community interests are like personal interests but instead of 
capturing the narrow regard for one’s self, family, and friends, they 
reflect a broader concern for one’s locality. Just as in a case that presents 
social or financial stakes, a person is likely to decide it in a way that 
serves those interests, so too may a case that holds implications for his 
community lead him to an outcome that serves its security, economy, or 
customs.197
Some “community concern[s]”
 But we do not condemn every such community interest as we 
do all personal interests among jurors. 
198 that vary across regions reflect the 
law’s resolve to provide a “jury . . . of the peers” from among “neighbors, 
fellows, [and] associates.”199 Those local values that reflect base 
retribution or bare parochialism erode the jury’s requisite objectivity. 
But we tolerate or even prize others, not just to “[]guard against the 
corrupt or overzealous prosecutor[,]” but also to vindicate a community’s 
shared (and unobjectionable) beliefs about race, faith, family, or justice 
that find expression in a certain time and place.200
Consider the community interest of Paul Butler’s proposal that 
juries enforce drug laws only very weakly, if at all, as a reaction to the 
mass incarceration of young black men within a particular area.
 
201 Or 
consider a community interest to harshly punish pornography based on 
regional norms of sexual morality.202 The subjective ideal suggests that 
these community interests deserve to be heard by a jury of peers. The 
text of the Sixth Amendment reflects this incorporation of community 
interests in jury decisionmaking when it follows the impartiality clause 
with the requirement that prospective jurors be selected from “the State 
and district wherein the crime shall have been committed.”203
 
 197. See Keise Izuma et al., Processing of the Incentive for Social Approval in the Ventral Striatum 
During Charitable Donation, 22 J. Cognitive Neurosci. 621, 628–29 (2010). 
 
 198. Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 570–71. 
 199. Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 308 (1880); see Oldham, supra note 58, at 176 
(contrasting peer with expert juries that include citizens with special knowledge or qualifications). 
 200. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 156 (1968). 
 201. See Paul Butler, Racially Based Jury Nullification: Black Power in the Criminal Justice System, 
105 Yale L.J. 677, 679 (1995). I propose measures to reduce the incidence of and pressures associated 
with jury nullification. See infra notes 247–248 and accompanying text. 
 202. See Robert F. Nagel, Unfocused Governmental Interests, 55 Alb. L. Rev. 573, 576–77 (1992) 
(discussing Justice Brennan’s dissent in Paris Adult Theatre v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49 (1973)). 
 203. U.S. Const. amend. VI. 
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a. Identifying 
Community interests arise when jurors identify with that community 
or feel pressure to conform to its perceived norms or welfare. The extent 
to which such identifying interests tend to influence a prospective juror 
depends on the strength of her group identification and relevance of that 
community interest to the issues presented at trial.204 These interests can 
arise independent of any case-specific exposure because a juror may 
identify with the community even if the “facts of the case were ‘neither 
heinous nor sensational’” and “media coverage ‘ha[d] . . . been objective 
and unemotional.’”205
Consider the community interest at stake in a criminal trial in Miami 
that had provoked pretrial race riots.
 
206 The case involved a Hispanic 
officer who was tried for the deaths of two African-American 
motorcyclists.207 An appeals court overturned the jury’s manslaughter 
conviction on the ground that the trial judge should have granted a 
change of venue to seek jurors who were not influenced by extra-
evidentiary considerations.208 Miami jurors were inclined to convict, the 
court explained, for fear that acquittal would have reignited violence in 
the city with which they identified.209
Consider also the identifying kind of community interests that 
plausibly affected the jurors who convicted the former CEO of Enron, 
the Houston-based energy and commodities corporation, for federal 
fraud and insider trading related to the company’s financial downfall. 
That Houston residents so strongly identified with Enron helps to 
explain why “animosity toward Jeffrey Skilling ran deep,” as Justice 




[M]ost Houstonians identified Enron with their city—the place of its 
founding and headquarters. Enron provided a source of pride for 
Houstonians, as well as a stimulus to the local economy. When the 
company descended into bankruptcy, thousands lost their jobs and 





 204. See Roland Bénabou & Jean Tirole, Incentives and Prosocial Behavior, 96 Am. Econ. Rev. 
1652, 1653 (2006). 
 
 205. Skilling v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 2896, 2901, 2908 (2010) (citations omitted). 
 206. See Tony Pugh, A Taut Tallahassee Waits as Lozano Trial Approaches, Miami Herald, 
Mar. 1, 1993, at lA. 
 207. See id.; see also Lozano v. State, 584 So. 2d 19, 21 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991). 
 208. See Lozano, 584 So. 2d at 22 n.5. The officer was acquitted on remand in Orlando. See Larry 
Rohters, Tension Surrenders to Relief as Miami Reacts to Verdict, N.Y. Times, May 30, 1993, at A18. 
 209. See Lozano, 584 So. 2d at 22–23. 
 210. See Skilling, 130 S. Ct. at 2954 (Sotomayor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 211. Christina Collins, Note, Stuck in the 1960s: Supreme Court Misses an Opportunity in Skilling v. 
United States to Bring Venue Jurisprudence into the Twenty-First Century, 44 Tex. Tech L. Rev. 391, 
415 (2012) (footnotes omitted). 
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It is not just that “four [of the jurors who decided the case] knew 
former Enron employees who lost [their] savings.”212 It is that those 
individuals who identify with Houston and the corporation once at the 
heart of it might quite reasonably seek to vindicate their disrupted sense 
of city “pride” in a manner that inclines them to return a verdict “against 
those who oversaw Enron’s collapse.”213
b. Conforming 
 That community interest should 
be tolerated as a relevant subjective perspective, so long as it does not 
ride roughshod over the competing ideal of jury objectivity. 
A prospective juror need not himself identify with a broader group 
for its values or goals to exert “outside influence” over his thinking about 
a case. A related interest arises when a juror who does not herself 
identify with the community nevertheless feels pressure to conform her 
decisionmaking in a way that would serve that community’s perceived 
interests. The Enron case is again instructive. Justice Sotomayor 
described such conforming interests in her dissent: “Juror 75, for 
instance, told the court, ‘I think a lot of people feel that they’re guilty. 
And maybe they’re expecting something to come out of this trial.’ It 
would be ‘tough,’ she recognized ‘to vote not guilty and go back into the 
community.’”214 The trial court in Skilling acknowledged this need to 
withstand community pressure upon return when it announced to potential 
jurors during voir dire that “it would take courage” for them to acquit.215
Another example comes from the trial of Timothy McVeigh for the 
Oklahoma City bombing that affected thousands of victims’ family and 
friends across the state.
 
216 The judge in the case was right to have ordered 
a change of venue, explaining that “[t]he effects of the explosion on that 
community are so profound and pervasive” that jurors who come from 
the community, whether or not they themselves shared the city’s values, 
could be expected to feel “a sense of obligation to reach a result which 
will find general acceptance in the relevant audience.”217 These interests 
cave to, rather than identify with, concern for the welfare of one’s 
community.218
 
 212. Brief for Petitioner at 13, Skilling v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 2896 (2010) (No. 08-1394), 2009 
WL 4818500, at *19. 
 
 213. United States v. Skilling, 554 F.3d 529, 561 (5th Cir. 2009), aff’d in part, 130 S. Ct. 2896 (2010). 
 214. Skilling, 130 S. Ct. at 2957 (Sotomayor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citations 
omitted). 
 215. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 212, at 9. 
 216. United States v. McVeigh, 918 F. Supp. 1467 (W.D. Okla. 1996). 
 217. Id. at 1470, 1473. 
 218. For more on brain correlates of conformity, see Vasily Klucharev et al., Downregulation of 
the Posterior Medial Frontal Cortex Prevents Social Conformity, 31 J. Neurosci. 11, 934 (2011). 
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2. Case-General Beliefs 
A second category of outside influences is, like community interests, 
a mixed bag, ranging from worthy perspectives to hateful intolerance. 
This last class of extra-trial factors that get lumped under the term bias 
comprises attitudes about the broader kinds of social groups or social 
ideologies relevant to the litigation but independent of the specific 
people or events at trial.219
These case-general beliefs concern views about a social group to 
which a party or witness belongs, and ideological views about the crime, 
defense, or punishment. Cases before the Supreme Court have considered 
jurors’ beliefs about whether the act that a defendant is said to have 
committed should be criminalized,
 
220 about whether a punishment such as 
the death penalty should (ever) be imposed,221 and about a defendant’s 
race, especially if the victim belongs to a different race.222
These case-general beliefs often relate to a case-salient cause or 
group with which a juror identifies, apart from her community writ large. 
Dan Kahan and his colleagues have demonstrated that people “tend 
selectively to credit empirical information in patterns congenial to their 
cultural values” under conditions like those at trial in which people must 
make sense of uncertain or ambiguous facts among competing claims 





The first kind of case-general beliefs concerns the social groups to 
which jurors belong or that the trial is perceived to implicate. Jurors 
bring to the court a range of life experiences and attitudes that relate to 
their being young or old, religious or atheist, “a man or woman, a black 
person or a white person, a low-wage laborer as distinct from a well-paid 
 
 219. See Note, Community Hostility and the Right to an Impartial Jury, 60 Colum. L. Rev. 349, 350 
(1960) (distinguishing “general knowledge and predisposition” from extraevidentiary beliefs that 
“operate solely in a particular case or with respect to a particular defendant”). 
 220. See Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 157 (1878) (holding that potential jurors living in 
polygamy were not impartial to serve in the trial of a defendant accused of bigamy). 
 221. See Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 423 (1985) (spelling out conditions under which states 
may exclude prospective jurors in capital cases for their opposition to the death penalty). 
 222. See Turner v. Murray, 476 U.S. 28, 33 (1986) (reversing death sentence of black defendant 
convicted of murdering white man because trial judge failed to ask about possible racial bias). 
 223. Dan M. Kahan et al., “They Saw a Protest”: Cognitive Illiberalism and the Speech-Conduct 
Distinction, 64 Stan. L. Rev. 851, 859 (2012); see Dan M. Kahan, Foreword: Neutral Principles, 
Motivated Cognition, and Some Problems for Constitutional Law, 125 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 24 (2011) 
(citations omitted) (“[M]ock jury studies have linked identity-protective cognition . . . to conflicting 
perceptions of the risk posed by a motorist fleeing the police in a high-speed chase; of the consent of a 
date rape victim who said ‘no’ but did not physically resist her assailant; of the volition of battered 
women who kill in self-defense; and of the use of intimidation by political protestors.”). 
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desk worker.”224
The normative valence of these affiliative case-general beliefs range 
from the laudable to the repugnant.
 Jurors might share such affiliations with parties, victims, 
attorneys, or witnesses in the case. These affiliations can in turn trigger 
assumptions that people from certain groups are more or less credible or 
dangerous, worthy of pity, or likely to reoffend. 
225 Juror attitudes that stigmatize or 
degrade other groups, for example, are worth avoiding more than 
statistical stereotypes or cultural norms. Differently situated people often 
perceive the same event in a very different light, depending on how they 
view social disadvantage or how they identify with the life experiences of 
others.226
The fact that a young black defendant from a poor neighborhood 
fled from the police, for instance, might be construed by a juror who 
grew up under similar conditions as evidence that the defendant feared 
mistreatment by police, but regarded by a juror from an affluent social 
background as evidence of the defendant’s guilt. Neither perspective 
should be excluded from deliberations simply because it reflects an 
outside source of juror influence. But certainly racial bigotry should. 
 
Affiliative beliefs are about more than race. They might also concern 
gender, national origin, and sexual orientation, or any number of socially 
salient occupations or roles—such as spouses, mechanics, and social 
activists—as well as traits and behaviors—such as old, loyal, and violent. 
Justice O’Connor has written, for example, that “the battered wife [] on 
trial for wounding her abusive husband” might reasonably seek “to 
ensure that the jury of her peers contains as many women members as 
possible.”227
Consider also affiliative beliefs that relate to a juror’s felony 
conviction: 
 
[A] person who has suffered the most severe form of condemnation 
that can be inflicted by the state . . . might . . . harbor a continuing 
resentment against ‘the system’ that punished him and [a uniquely 
 
 224. Taylor v. Sisto, 606 F.3d 622, 627–28 (9th Cir. 2010), superseded by 449 F. App’x 665 (9th Cir. 
2011) (linking “[t]he requirement of representativeness . . . to the varied and unique experiences that 
Americans of different backgrounds bring into the jury box”). 
 225. See supra notes 66–70 and accompanying text. 
 226. See, e.g., Dov Fox, Silver Spoons and Golden Genes: Genetic Engineering and the Egalitarian 
Ethos, 33 Am. J.L. & Med. 567, 592, 592 n.154 (2007); see id. at 593 n.159 (explaining why, for example, 
“white males [might] struggle empathizing with the obstacles that females and minorities face in a 
social system characterized by patriarchy and racial prejudice”). 
 227. See J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 149, 151 (1994) (O’Connor, J., concurring) 
(explaining that “one need not be a sexist to share the intuition that in certain cases a person’s gender 
and resulting life experience will be relevant to his or her view of the case”); see also Abbott Labs. 
Supplemental Brief Regarding United States v. Windsor, Smithkline Beecham Corp. v. Abbott Labs., 
740 F.3d 471 (9th Cir. 2014) (Nos. 11-17357, 11-17373), 2014 WL 211807 (concerning whether 
prospective jurors can be excluded from service on the basis of their sexual orientation). 
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informed perspective, even if typically in] favor of the defendant on 
trial, who is seen as a fellow underdog caught in its toils.228
The same twin charge of hostility or empathy might be levied against a 
juror who himself or whose loved one has fallen victim to a tort or crime 
that resembles the events or crimes at issue in the trial.
 
229
The powerful influence of these affiliations coheres with the “story 
model” of jurors who reconstruct legal facts as a narrative whose themes 





mixed bag of affiliative case-general beliefs demands a more tailored 
response than uprooting such bias across the board. I will explain this 
approach after clarifying ideological case-general beliefs below. 
Among the ideological kind of case-general beliefs are moral, 
political, or religious commitments that relate to those presented at trial. 
Consider jurors who hold strong opinions about, for instance, obscenity 
in a child pornography case, tort reform in a class action suit, or 
environmentalism in a pollution case. Commentators in the George 
Zimmerman trial have similarly seen the case as a referendum for issues 
ranging from self-defense and gun ownership to racial profiling and civil 
rights.231 The juror who feels passionately about a particular cause in a 
case that she perceives as implicating it may find it difficult to be 
dispassionate about the outcome in the way that the objective ideal of 
the jury requires. Scientists have shown that abstract belief systems 
correspond to psychological differences explained in part by the human 
needs for security and solidarity.232
Not all ideological case-general beliefs are objectionable. They 





 228. Rubio v. Superior Court, 593 P.2d 595, 600 (Cal. 1979). 
 We applaud the case-general beliefs that jurors held 
against “the morally-obnoxious fugitive slave laws,” for example, as we 
do those jurors who refused to indict “John Peter Zenger, a newspaper 
publisher charged with libel after criticizing the Governor of New 
 229. See Brian C. Kalt, The Exclusion of Felons from Jury Service, 53 Am. U. L. Rev. 65, 127 (2003). 
 230. See, e.g., Nancy Pennington & Reid Hastie, A Cognitive Theory of Juror Decision Making: 
The Story Model, 13 Cardozo L. Rev. 519, 519–20 (1991). 
 231. See, e.g., Adam Weinstein, The Trayvon Martin Killing, Explained, Mother Jones (Mar. 18, 
2012, 9:42 AM), http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2012/03/what-happened-trayvon-martin-explained. 
 232. See, e.g., Drew Westen, The Political Brain: The Role of Emotion in Deciding the Fate 
of the Nation (2007); John T. Jost et al., Political Ideology: Its Structure, Functions, and Elective 
Affinities, 60 Ann. Rev. Psychol. 307, 337 (2009). 
 233. United States v. Navarro-Vargas, 408 F.3d 1184, 1199 (9th Cir. 2005) (en banc) (holding that 
grand jury independence has historically served causes both good and ill). 
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York . . . because the jurors were politically opposed to the 
prosecutions.”234
A more contentious case concerns juror views about the death 
penalty. Some jurors have conscientious scruples against capital 
punishment broadly or believe that defendants from disadvantaged groups 
in particular deserve mercy because the criminal justice system tends to 
treat them worse.
 
235 Other jurors strongly favor the death penalty as a 
symbol of opposition to social deviance or commitment to individual 
responsibility.236 The Supreme Court has held that “those who firmly 
believe that the death penalty is unjust may nevertheless serve as jurors 
in capital cases so long as they . . . are willing to temporarily set aside 
their own beliefs in deference to” the state’s interest in carrying out its 
capital punishment laws.237
This standard permits a trial judge to excuse for cause the potential 
juror who would not, during the sentencing phase, be able to impose a 
sentence of death, however heinous and unmitigated the crime.
 
238 But the 
Supreme Court erred in authorizing the dismissal of a juror for her 
widely held scruples—because she would reserve the punishment of 
execution for very grave cases—where she nonetheless affirmed her 
ability and willingness to consider mitigating and aggravating factors as 
required under the state laws.239
*** 
 
 That only a subset of case-general beliefs and community interests 
warrant exclusion from the jury makes these across-the-board categories, 
as with personal interests and case-specific beliefs, an unfitting basis for 
presumptive, indiscriminate disqualification. For personal interests and 
 
 234. Id. at 1192, 1199; see Vidmar & Hans, supra note 47, at 225 (“If Northern juries of the 1850s 
acquitted the courageous people who harbored slaves in defiance of the Fugitive Slave Act, Southern 
juries a hundred years later acquitted people who had beaten and killed the descendants of those 
slaves as they attempted to assert their legal rights.”). 
 235. See Uttecht v. Brown, 551 U.S. 1, 35 (2007) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“A cross section of 
virtually every community in the country includes citizens who firmly believe the death penalty is 
unjust but who nevertheless are qualified to serve as jurors in capital cases.”). 
 236. Dan M. Kahan and colleagues contrast anti-death penalty “egalitarian/solidarists” with pro-
death penalty “hierarchist/individualists.” Dan M. Kahan, The Secret Ambition of Deterrence, 
113 Harv. L. Rev. 413, 439–42 (1999); John Gastil et al., The ‘Wildavsky Heuristic’: The Cultural 
Orientation of Mass Political Opinion 19–21 (Oct. 15, 2005) (unpublished article), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=834264. 
 237. Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162, 176 (1986). 
 238. See generally Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412 (1985) (expounding on the proper standard for 
determining when prospective jurors may be excluded based on capital punishment views). 
 239. Uttecht, 551 U.S. at 44 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The juror gave as an example of the kind of 
case in which he might vote for death one in which the defendant would reoffend if released from 
prison. When the attorneys clarified that under the state death penalty statute, the jury could sentence 
a capital defendant only to death or life without parole—thus preventing any chance of the 
defendant’s release—the juror confirmed that he would consider and impose the death penalty in the 
appropriate circumstance. Id. at 36–37 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
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case-specific beliefs, courts need only assess their presence and 
magnitude. I propose questionnaires that ask potential jurors about their 
knowledge of the people and events at trial and their social or financial 
stakes in the case. The uniform threat that these sources of influence 
pose to jury impartiality warrants a low threshold for presumptive 
exclusion.240
For community interests and case-general beliefs, by contrast, some 
subvert the tension between an objective and subjective ideal of the jury, 
while others enrich that balance. I propose accommodating their 
influence by forgoing voir dire and declining to question prospective 
jurors about community interests and case-general beliefs. This will 
permit valued outside influences among these to assume their rightful 
place on the jury, yet will also let in those among them that are 
pernicious. I am not sanguine about the pervasive evil of biases like 
racial bigotry. To rein these darker manifestations of community 
interests and case-general beliefs, trial courts should supplement their 
broad acceptance with deeper jury pool diversity before voir dire and 
pretrial judicial instructions that encourage perspective sharing.
 I would indeed limit voir dire to those instances in which it is 
useful to clarify ambiguous written responses about personal interests or 
case-specific beliefs. 
241
Community interests and case-general beliefs on the jury are 
managed better on the other side of the Atlantic. In England, potential 
jurors are not dismissed for these or other unspecified reasons, as the 
practice of peremptory challenges permits in the United States.
 
242
Declining to ask potential jurors about community interests and 
case-general beliefs is not a panacea. But it is better than our heavy 
reliance on peremptories. Eligible jurors who are “selected at random,” 
and thereby received “as they come,” Lord Denning explained over 
thirty years ago, tend to “represent the views of the common man” and 
“the people as a whole” better than jurors who survive objection by the 
parties after being “cross-examine[d]” for “their views on this matter or 
that which may arise in the course of the hearing—so as to see if they are 
prejudiced in any way.”
 
Limiting juror exclusions to personal interests and case-specific beliefs is 
the first step in achieving balance between subjective and objective 
elements of the impartial jury. 
243
 
 240. See supra notes 
 
193–185 and accompanying text. 
 241. That my proposed means of empanelling juries are quicker and cheaper than voir dire may, as 
a welcome byproduct, make it more likely that disputes will be resolved through trial rather than 
either plea bargaining in the criminal context, coercive as it tends to be, or civil settlements based on 
deficient discovery. See John H. Langbein, The Disappearance of Civil Trial in the United States, 
122 Yale L.J. 522, 561–64 (2012) (discussing the costs and benefits of civil and criminal trials). 
 242. See, e.g., Pullar v. H.M. Advocate, (1993) J.C. 126, 134–35 (Scot.). 
 243. Regina v. Sheffield Crown Ct, ex parte Brownlow, [1980] Q.B. 530 (C.A.) 541–42. 
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A more inclusionary approach to community interests and case-
general beliefs that prevents either side from seeking to bend the 
composition of the jury in its favor would allay suspicions that 
prospective jurors are removed for reasons that are capricious, 
speculative, cynical, or sinister.244 The abolition of peremptories would 
also save time, judicial resources, and privacy risks, while reducing the 
reliance on jury consultants—a low-tech neuro-voir dire available only to 
the affluent—that exacerbates inequalities between the parties.245
Allowing anyone who harbors such biases to serve, however, poses a 
real danger that more juries will hang, reach unjust verdicts, or refuse to 
follow the law. That is because ignorance about jurors’ community 
interests and case-general beliefs, without more, jeopardizes the jury’s 
essential objective dimension by making it more likely that people with 
harmful such biases are allowed to sit. It will not do to abide by Lord 
Denning’s assurance that “the chances are 1,000 to one against any juror 
[who emerges randomly] being found unsuitable.”
 
246 There is a real 
threat that drawing community interests and case-general beliefs into the 
jury room could unwittingly slant the attitudes with which jurors arrive to 
trial, frustrate their openness to persuasion in the course of deliberations, 
or subvert the prospect of agreement upon a verdict.247
To mitigate these risks, I propose supplementing narrow bias-
specific questionnaires with two reforms designed to discipline 
overpowering and otherwise objectionable case-general beliefs and 
community interests within the dynamics of group decisionmaking. The 
first—deepening diversification of the jury pool—would take place 
before jurors are selected; the second—identity-affirming instructions—
would take place after.
 
248
First, I would diversify jury pool by adding to the source list those 
who pay income tax, who receive public assistance, or who have recently 
moved or become citizens. The Supreme Court has squarely rejected the 
view that “a constitutionally impartial jury can be constructed . . . by 
‘balancing’ the various predispositions of the individual jurors.”
 
249
Take affiliative case-general biases about race in the Zimmerman 
trial, in which a jury with no black members determined that the shooting 
 Yet 
the taming of good and bad biases may require less. 
 
 244. See supra note 83 and accompanying text. 
 245. See Hoffman, supra note 83, at 29. 
 246. Regina v. Sheffield Crown Ct, ex parte Brownlow, [1980] Q.B. 530 (C.A.) 542. 
 247. Dov Fox, Retracing Liberalism and Remaking Nature: Designer Children, Research Embryos, 
and Featherless Chickens, 24 Bioethics 170, 173 (2010). 
 248. The implementation of any such debiasing mechanisms should of course be sensitive to the 
risks of under- or over-correction. See Timothy D. Wilson et al., Mental Contamination and the 
Debiasing Problem, in Heuristics and Biases: The Psychology of Intuitive Judgment 185, 191 
(Thomas Gilovich et al. eds., 2002). 
 249. See Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162, 177–78 (1986); see also supra notes 57–61. 
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death of a young black man in Florida did not constitute a crime. A month 
after Martin was killed, economists published a study of conviction rates 
in 700 Florida felony trials from 2000 to 2010 based on the composition 
of potential jurors called to the courthouse, controlling for racial 
composition of jurors ultimately selected to serve.250
When the pool of eligible jurors drawn from a community included 
no black members, black defendants were convicted at a rate almost 
twenty percent higher than white defendants.
 Their findings are 
shocking. 
251 But when there was even 
a single black person in the jury pool, the conviction rate was lower for 
black defendants than for whites.252 So conviction rates for blacks and 
whites nearly flipped based on whether just one black person was 
randomly assigned to the jury pool.253 This stunning finding controlled for 
a wide range of variables including the race, gender, and age of seated 
jurors and the offense class and history of the defendant.254
Why might racial diversity in the pool from which jurors are chosen 
be thought to influence jury verdicts or even curb prejudice or promote 
empathy? Two kinds of explanations emerge from the neuroscience of 
bias control, each corresponding to the internal as opposed to external 
reasons to control bias.
 
255 The first explanation is that jurors’ engagement 
alongside people of different races as they wait in the courthouse before 
trial might enlarge perspectives and shape perceptions in constructive 
ways, even if the jury itself is not diverse.256 By confronting eventual 
jurors with the live possibility of serving with people from other races, 
this background condition of pretrial diversity has the power to activate 
internal commitments to cross-racial understanding or attenuate the 
expression of pejorative stereotypes during trial.257
The second reason is that jury pool diversity promises to subdue the 





 250. See Shamena Anwar et al., The Impact of Jury Race in Criminal Trials, 127 Q. J. Eco. 1017, 
1017–19 (2012). 
 Jurors’ awareness that they might need to reach a 
shared verdict with those who are different, other studies suggest, leads 
 251. Id. at 1034–35. 
 252. Id. at 1035. 
 253. Id. 
 254. Id. at 1032–34. 
 255. See supra notes 95–102 and accompanying text. 
 256. See Samuel R. Sommers, On Racial Diversity and Group Decision Making: Identifying Multiple 
Effects of Racial Composition on Jury Deliberations, 90 J. Person. & Soc. Psychol. 597, 607–08 (2006). 
 257. See id. at 602. Cf. Kang et al., supra note 74, at 1172 (arguing that “reminding [jurors] of 
countertypical associations . . . might momentarily activate different mental patterns while in the 
courthouse and reduce the impact of implicit biases on their decisionmaking”). 
 258. Studies show that white jurors who serve on racially mixed juries—as opposed to all-white 
ones—are less likely, by a considerable measure, to think that a black defendant is guilty, not just after 
they deliberate, but even before trial. See Sommers, supra note 256, at 604–05. 
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them to lay greater emphasis on actual and missing evidence in 
deliberations, permit fewer inaccurate statements to go uncorrected, and 
undertake richer dialogue on sensitive matters, without greater risk of 
hung or nullifying juries.259 Researchers explain that diversity in the jury 
pool prompts jurors, for fear of being perceived as prejudiced, to engage 
more carefully with the evidence and more openly with ideals and 
backgrounds other than their own.260
The inclusion of other case-general beliefs and community interests 
in the jury pool might in a similar way help to encourage perspective 
sharing and critical appraisal of unreflective sources of outside influence. 
The procedures that trial courts use to create jury pools today often 
exclude, without meaning to, a disproportionate number of minorities and 
others who tend to appear less on lists of voters or licensed drivers, who do 
not remain at one address for long enough to receive a jury summons, or 
cannot obtain transportation to the courthouse or time off from work.
 
261
But jurisdictions need not oversample from minority or otherwise 
targeted neighborhoods to achieve the desired diversity in jury pool.
 
262 
They could also expand the source list properties to include more 
minorities and others who appear less frequently on lists of voters and 
licensed drivers.263 Diversifying the jury pool using such non-salient 
measures would enhance balanced deliberations without risking trading 
on false or demeaning assumptions about jurors in the way that cross-
section jurisprudence forbids.264
My second proposal advocates adoption of the judicial instructions 
that judges and scholars have long derided but that debiasing research 
has more recently commended as a promising way to enrich discourse 
 
 
 259. See id. at 609–10. Social psychologists have found that this prejudice-mitigating effect is even 
stronger within decisionmaking contexts for which race is less salient, as when the victim and 
defendant belong to different races, but race is not made a prominent issue at trial. See Samuel R. 
Sommers, Race and the Decision Making of Juries, 12 Legal & Criminological Psychol. 171, 174 
(2007); see also Cynthia Lee, Making Race Salient: Trayvon Martin and Implicit Bias in a Not Yet Post-
Racial Society, 91 N.C. L. Rev. 1555, 1589–90 (2013) (“The research on race salience suggests that it is 
important to highlight the relevance of race and make jurors aware of the possibility of racial bias if 
one is concerned that implicit racial bias might result in unfair treatment of either a Black defendant 
or a Black victim.”). 
 260. See, e.g., Nilanjana Dasgupta & Luis M. Rivera, When Social Context Matters: The Influence of 
Long-Term Contact and Short-Term Exposure to Admired Outgroup Members on Implicit Attitudes and 
Behavioral Intentions, 26 Soc. Cognition 112, 115–16 (2008). See generally Tor D. Wager et al., 
Prefrontal-Subcortical Pathways Mediating Successful Emotion Regulation, 59 Neuron 1037 (2008) 
(identifying prefrontal pathways that regulate emotion and using them to predict a reduction in emotion). 
 261. See, e.g., In re Jury Plan of E. Dist. of N.Y., 61 F.3d 119, 121–22 (2d Cir. 1995). 
 262. See generally United States v. Ovalle, 136 F.3d 1092 (6th Cir. 1998) (holding unconstitutional 
racially salient efforts to achieve demographic balance within the jury pool). 
 263. See Nancy J. King, Racial Jurymandering: Cancer or Cure? A Contemporary Review of 
Affirmative Action in Jury Selection, 68 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 707, 712–14 (1993). 
 264. See, e.g., Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 369 (1979). 
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and reduce polarization.265 David Sklansky and others have suggested that 
“the growing body of research on debiasing gives reason to think” that 
such curative instructions “make it less likely that jurors will over-rely on” 
or “react emotionally to” some factor whose undesirability a judge clearly 
explains.266
Consider case-general racial bigotry, whether it is deliberative or 
automatic. Federal District Court Judge Mark Bennett, for example, 
instructs jurors to avoid such biases that we all share in a non-accusatory 
way that seeks to avoid putting jurors on the defensive or provoking their 
resistance.
 
267 The existing psychology research does not yet convince me 
that judicial admonitions that jurors be aware of their own decisionmaking 
processes or set aside certain sources of influence will be effective.268
More encouraging is the prospect of using judicial instruction to 
affirm a prospective juror’s sense of self-worth in ways that “suppl[y] a 
buffer against the psychic cost associated with giving open-minded 
evaluation to threatening information.”
 
269 The expression of “moderation 
or equivocation within groups” and of “openness or ambivalence by 
those in the opposing group,” Dan M. Kahan and his colleagues suggest, 
can relieve the dangers of community interests and case-general beliefs 
by creating conditions under which jurors are more willing to entertain 
diverging attitudes and “display cooperative open-mindedness.”270
Kahan and colleagues derive from the psychological literature a 
mechanism by which to stimulate such identity-affirmation on the jury. 
Judges should instruct jurors, they propose, “to speak in turn and to 
identify not only his or her own position but also the strongest 
counterargument to it” to disrupt exaggerated assumptions of division 
and afford jurors cover to reveal their ambivalence.
 
271 Instructing jurors 
before they are seated to deliberate in this give-and-take way will make 
jurors less likely to act on the automatic biases that they do not on 
reflection endorse but nonetheless hold. And it may even better the 
chances that over the course of trial, they will “have given sympathetic 
attention to evidence contrary to their cultural predispositions.”272
 
 265. See Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S. 440, 453 (1949) (Jackson, J., concurring) (“The 
naïve assumption that prejudicial effects can be overcome by instructions to the jury is one that all 
practicing lawyers know to be unmitigated fiction.”); Peter J. Smith, New Legal Fictions, 95 Geo. L.J. 
1435, 1451–52 (2007) (referring to the “presumption that jurors can understand and follow limiting 
instructions” as a “legal fiction”). 
 
 266. Sklansky, supra note 9, at 416. 
 267. Mark W. Bennett, Unraveling the Gordian Knot of Implicit Bias in Jury Selection: The 
Problems of Judge-Dominated Voire Dire, the Failed Promise of Batson, and Proposed Solutions, 
4 Harv. L & Pol’y Rev. 149, 169 (2010). 
 268. See Sklansky, supra note 9, at 439. 
 269. Kahan et al., supra note 223, at 896. 
 270. Id. at 896–97 (emphasis omitted). 
 271. Id. at 897. 
 272. Id. 
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Conclusion 
Many critics of the Zimmerman verdict expressed their frustration 
in terms of jury bias.273
The conception of jury bias that much of impartiality doctrine takes 
for granted sweeps every source of outside influence under that vague 
concept. No such monolithic conception of bias can meaningfully 
distinguish those outside sources of juror influence that inform a fair trial 
from those that infect it. There is instead, I have argued, a spectrum of 
cognitive biases—personal interests, community interests, case-specific 
beliefs, and case-general beliefs—whose constitutional statuses and 
normative valences vary considerably. 
 This Article argues that this charge of bias is, 
articulated at that level of abstraction, never enough to challenge a juror 
or verdict. 
I have recommended that courts vindicate the objective ideal of the 
jury by purging only personal interests and case-specific beliefs and that 
they vindicate the subjective ideal by adopting a more inclusive approach 
with respect to community interests and case-general beliefs. The 
practical effect of adopting these recommendations is to expand recusal 
for cause, abolish peremptory challenges, and implement low-cost 
debiasing measures that are informed by the most reliable available 
evidence from social psychology and neuroscience. 
 
 
 273. See, e.g., Richard Gabriel, Race, Bias and the Zimmerman Jury, CNN Opinion (July 16, 2013, 
4:14 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2013/07/16/opinion/gabriel-bias-zimmerman; Joe Patrice, The Rise and 
Fall of Juror B37 and How Verdicts Are Made, Above the Law (July 16, 2013, 12:34 PM), 
http://abovethelaw.com/2013/07/the-rise-and-fall-of-juror-b37-and-how-verdicts-are-made; Rhonda 
Waller, Juror Bias and the Trayvon Martin Case, Applied Soc. Psychol. (July 31, 2013, 3:48 PM), 
http://www.personal.psu.edu/bfr3/blogs/asp/2013/07/juror-bias-and-the-trayvon-martin-case.html. 
